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CONTEMPT OF COURT
A DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF
CONTEMPT OF COURT AT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL




In 2006, Human Rights Watch ("HRW") published on its website a book
entitled Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, A Topical Digest of
the Case Law of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY
Digest").' The 861-page HRW ICTY Digest contained the digests of every trial
and appeal judgment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal from its inception in 1993 up
through December 31, 2005.2 It was an indispensible work because none of the
commercial entities that comprehensively digested domestic judgments into
"headnotes" did the same for the international tribunal decisions. Around 2003,
the author personally contacted West Publishing3 to ask them to consider
"headnoting" the Yugoslavia Tribunal judgments. The representative the author
spoke to politely declined, explaining that the audience that might use such a
product was too limited to justify the expense of such an endeavor.4
* David Akerson is a Senior Consultant to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a former lecturer at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law, a former trial attorney with the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the former Chief of Evidence with the
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, a Public Defender with the Dade County
Public Defender's Office and an attorney with South African Lawyers for Human Rights.
** Nandish Wijetilleke is a graduate from the University of Denver Sturm College of Law and
Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey where he specialized in peace and conflict
studies. He currently serves the legal needs of low-income individuals, seniors, and migrant
farmworkers as a staff attorney for Legal Aid Services of Oklahoma, Inc.
1. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: A TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2006), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/ictyO7O6/lCTYweb.pdf
2. Id. at ii.
3. West Publishing is now known as West, a business unit of Thomson Reuters.
4. Interview citation
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Attorneys in the United States take for granted the fact that our domestic trial
and appellate decisions will be automatically and quickly digested by several
sources, organized into topical indexes and incorporated into sophisticated
electronic research tools.5 Those of us practicing at the international tribunals did
not have that luxury prior to the ICTY Digest. What was available to us was the
full text of the judgments, along with a smattering of our own internal memoranda
and articles in the various legal journals scattered around the world.6 The tribunal
judgments are extremely lengthy, typically five hundred pages or more, and
scanning these judgments for the kernels of law contained within them was
inefficient to say the least. Memoranda and journal articles-while very useful
and insightful-analyzed only specific areas of law.
The ICTY Digest represented the first and a very successful attempt at a
comprehensive digesting of tribunal law. It was pithy, clear and well-organized.
Human Rights Watch followed up the ICTY Digest in 2010 with a 500-page book
that digested all of the trial and appeal judgments of the Rwanda Tribunal ("ICTR
Digest").7 For the undersigned author, the two HRW digests are still the first
resource to be consulted when conducting research on the law of the tribunals. 8
The one exception to this rule is the law of contempt. While the two Digests dealt
with the judgments in the substantive trials, they did not deal with the tribunal
judgments in the ancillary contempt of court trials.
All courts are imbued with the power to hold in contempt of court those who
interfere with its administration of justice.9  Interference may range from a
spontaneous courtroom disruption to a well-orchestrated plan to intimidate a
witness outside of the courtroom. From their inception, the international tribunals
have had to prosecute individuals under their contempt powers in order to protect
the integrity of their proceedings. 10 To date, nearly seventy judgments have been
5. See, e.g., THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-
products/westlaw-legal-research/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); LEXIsNEXIS,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/gateway.page (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
6. See, e.g., All Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations2 2and%/ 20cases/ases/Pages/cases%20index.aspx (last visited Apr. 9,
2016).
7. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: A DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
(2010), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ictrOl 0webwcover.pdf.
8. Unfortunately, neither the ICTY nor the ICTY digests have been updated since their release.
9. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2015) (stating "[a] court of the United States shall have the power
to punish by fine or impiosnment... such contempt of its authority..."); see also Silvia D'Ascoli,
Sentencing Contempt of Court in International Criminal Justice, 5 J. INT'; CRIM. JUST. 735, 739 n.14
(2007) (stating "[iun common law systems, the power exists independently of legal codification, as [the
power to hold in contempt of court] is considered an inherent power").
10. See RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, INT'L TRIB. CRIM.FOR RWANDA, at Rule 77, U.N.
Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995), https://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/RWANDAI.htm; RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, at Rule 77, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.43 (1996).
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issued against contemnors at international tribunals.
This article is a comprehensive set of digests of the contempt trial and appeal
judgments of the international tribunals. In homage the HRW Digests, we follow
the format of those books as closely as possible. The article organizes topically the
digested judgments"1 from the following tribunals: the ICTY, ICTR, The Special
Court for Sierra Leone, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
and The Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 12 It is intended to be a reference tool to
assist practitioners and researchers as they familiarize themselves with the law of
contempt of court at the international tribunals.
The digest includes judgments publicly available through July 1, 2015. A full
list of the judgments included is listed on pages 10 1- 105.
The digest is not intended to be and should not be used as a substitute for the
reading of the actual decisions at the tribunals. The full text of the judgments can
be found on the respective tribunal websites.
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rulesrocedure-evidence/1T032Rev43_en.pdf, RULES
OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Special Court for Sierra Leone, at Rule 77,
https://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/SCSL/Rules-of-proced-SCSL.pdf; INTERNAL RULES (REV. 2),
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, at Rule 35 (2008),
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/historyECCCLaw-ProcedureIntemal-
Rules.pdf; RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, at Rule 60bis,
STUBD/2009/Rev.4 (2009), https://www.stl-tsl.org/images/RPE/20140403 STL-BD-2009-01 -Rev-6-
Corr-lEN.pdf. See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RULES AND PRINCIPLES 743-50
(Goran Sluiter et al., eds., 2013).
11. Like the ICTY and ICTR Digests, we digested trial and appellate judgments. Motion practice
is not analyzed with one exception. At the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, contempt proceedings were
initiated In The Case Against Al Jadeed [CO.] S.A.L./New T.V. S.A.L. (N.T.V.) and Kanna Mohamad
Tahsin Al Khayat, STL-14-05/T/CJ. Trial proceedings concluded as of June 19, 2015, but to date
Chambers have not issued its judgment in the matter. Certain decisions on pre-trial motions were
included from this case because of their novelty and importance, and because of the pending nature of
the judgment.
12. Referred to collectively as the "tribunals."
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SUMMARY OF JUDGEMENTS AGAINST THE ACCUSED
Al Jadeed [CO.J S.A.L. / New T.V. S.A.L. (N.T.V.), was a television station
operating in Lebanon and charged as a legal person by the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon on two charges of contempt of court in Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al. Al
Jadeed was found not guilty on both counts. The first count pertained to a series of
broadcast episodes that interfered with the administration of justice by disclosing
information about purported confidential witness hence undermining public
confidence in the tribunal. The second count pertained to the alleged failure to
remove the aforementioned episodes from Al Jadeed's website and official
YouTube channel in violation of a court order.
Anto Nobilo, was counsel for the Defense in the Prosecutor v. Tihomir
Blaki6, and found guilty of contempt for revealing the identity of a protected
-witness in the Prosecutor v. Aleksovski and fined approximately E4,000 euros. The
Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber's decision due to errors of law
and fact including the failure to prove willful blindness or actual knowledge, the
omission of specific charges in the indictment, and no discussion of what
constitutes a knowing violation.
Margaret Fomba Brima, Neneh Binta Bah Jallow, Anifa Kamara and
Ester Kamara, wives and relatives of the three defendants in Prosecutor against
Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Kanu, pled guilty to
contempt for knowingly and willfully threatening and intimidating a witness while
she was leaving the court. Each was sentenced to one-year probation subject to
certain conditions including good behavior.
Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, while serving
sentences for convictions by the SCSL, were charged with contempt along with
Hassan Papa Bangura and Samuel Kargbo whom they enlisted to induce
Prosecution witnesses to recant their testimony in the cases against them. The
Trial Chamber found Bangura and Kanu guilty of knowing and willfully
interfering with the administration of justice by offering a bribe and otherwise
interfering with a witness who testified before the Chamber. Kamara was found
guilty for knowing and willfully interfering with the administration of justice by
otherwise interfering with a witness and disclosing the identity of a protected
witness in knowing violation of a Chamber order. Kargbo pled guilty to
knowingly and willfully interfering with the administration of justice by otherwise
interfering with a witness. Bangura was sentenced to eighteen months
imprisonment with credit for time served. Kargbo was sentenced to eighteen
months imprisonment with the entire sentence suspended. Kamara was sentenced
to eighteen months, but received credit for two weeks served, leaving a total
sentence of one year and 50 days. Kanu was sentenced to one year and 50 days for
each count to be served concurrently.
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GAA, a witness designated by that pseudonym in Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu
Kamuhanda, pled guilty to knowingly and willfully giving false testimony during
evidentiary hearings before the Appeals Chamber in Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda's
appeal of his conviction. GAA falsely recanted testimony that he was present at
Gikomero Parish and witnessed the actions of Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda at the time
of a massacre. He stated that he was induced to recant his testimony by Leonidas
Nshogoza who offered him a bribe to give false testimony. The Trial Chamber
sentenced GAA to nine months imprisonment with time served.
Beqa Beqaj, was a building worker from Kosovo who was charged with
contempt, attempted contempt, and incitement of contempt, for threatening,
intimidating, and interfering with witnesses B I and B2 in the Prosecutor v. Limaj
et al. case by trying to convince them to change their testimony. The Trial
Chamber found Beqaj guilty for knowingly and wilfully interfering with potential
witness B 1 but found the information regarding threats and intimidation of B 1 and
B2, interference with B2, and attempted and incitement of contempt to be
inconclusive. Beqaj was sentenced to four months imprisonment with credit for
pre-trial and trial detention.
Courtenay Griffiths, lead defense counsel in the Prosecutor v. Charles
Ghankay Taylor case, was charged with contempt for knowingly and willfully
disclosing the identities of seven protected prosecution witnesses in the Defense's
final trial brief. The Trial Chamber found Griffiths not guilty, finding that the
alleged disclosure, in a Defense Trial Brief to be filed with the Trial Chamber that
was already aware of the identifying information and the names of protected
witnesses, did not support a finding of willful intent.
Astrit Haraqija, the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sport, and Bajrush
Morina, a political advisor to the deputy minister of the Ministry of Culture,
Youth and Sport, were found guilty of contempt for interfering with a protected
witness, Witness 2, in the Haradinaj et al. case. The Trial Chamber imposed terms
of imprisonment of three months for Morina and five months for Haraqija. The
Appeals Chamber reversed Haraqija's conviction finding that the Trial Chamber
erred by placing decisive weight on untested evidence emanating from Morina.
Florence Hartmann, a former spokesperson for the Prosecutor and journalist
at the time of the indictment was found guilty of contempt for disclosing the
contents and purported effect of Appeals Chamber decisions in a book and article,
in violation of a court order. The Trial Chamber fined Hartmann E7,000 euros.
Baton Haxhiu, a journalist from Kosovo, was found guilty of contempt for
disclosing the identity of a protected witness in Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al. in an
article he both wrote and published. The Trial Chamber found the disclosure to be
a knowing violation of a court order as a result of statements in the article that
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referred to the witness as a protected witness. The Trial Chamber fined Haxhiu
C7,000 euros.
Dragan JokR, while serving a nine-year sentence for aiding and abetting the
extermination, murder, and persecution of Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica, was
found guilty of contempt for refusing to testify in the case of Popovi et al. and
sentenced to four months imprisonment to be to be served consecutively to any
other sentence of imprisonment imposed on Jokic.
Josip JoviW, served as the editor-in-chief of Slobodna Dalmaci'a, a Croatian
newspaper. He was found guilty of contempt for disclosing confidential
information concerning a protected witness in Prosecutor v. BlaskiW in articles
published on his website. The Trial Chamber fined Jovi6 C20,000 euros.
Shefqet Kabashi, a former member of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
and key prosecution witness in the trial of Haradinaj et al., pled guilty to contempt
for refusing to testify and failing to appear upon summons by the Trial Chamber.
He was sentenced to two months imprisonment with credit for time served.
Karma Khayat, served as Deputy Head of News and Political Programs and
was a shareholder of Al Jadeed TV. Khayat was charged by the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon on two charges of contempt of court in Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al.
The first count pertained to a series of broadcast episodes that interfered with the
administration of justice by disclosing information about purported confidential
witness hence undermining public confidence in the tribunal. The second count
pertained to the alleged failure to remove the aforementioned episodes from
intemet websites after receiving a court order to do so. She was found not guilty
on count one and guilty on count two.
Milka Maglov, was counsel for the defense in Prosecutor v. Radoslav
Brdjanin when she was charged for contempt for allegedly intimidating a witness
and disclosing a witness's identity to a third party in violation of a court order.
The Trial Chamber dismissed the motion for acquittal and directed an order for the
registrar to investigate the allegations. Ultimately, the Trial Chamber terminated
the contempt proceedings against Maglov and all charges were withdrawn.
Domagoj Margetik, a Croation journalist, was found guilty of contempt for
publishing a confidential witness list from the Prosecutor v. Tihomir BlaWki6 case
on his website. The witness list had been provided to him in a previous indictment
for contempt that had been withdrawn by the Prosecutor prior to the case being
heard. The Trial Chamber found Margeti6 guilty for disclosure in violation of a
court order and interfering with a witness. The Trial Chamber sentenced Margeti6
to three months imprisonment in addition to a fine of E 10,000 euros.
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Ivica MarijaWi , was editor in chief of Hrvatski List, a Croatian newspaper,
in which he authored and published an article that revealed the identity of a
protected witness in the Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaki6 case. The article was
published adjacent to an interview with Markica Rebi, former head of the
Security Information Service, an intelligence branch of the Croatian government.
The article revealed that Rebi6 provided the name of the witness as well copies and
transcripts of the witness's closed session testimony. The Trial Chamber found
Marijai6 guilty for deliberately and knowingly publishing protected information
and Rebi guilty for knowingly disclosing a copy of a witness statement from
closed session testimony. The Trial Chamber issued fines of E 15,000 euros each.
Kosta Bulatovik, a defense witness in the Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milogevi
case was found guilty of contempt for maintaining his refusal to answer questions
on cross examination by the Prosecutor after being advised of the consequences of
doing so. The Trial Chamber sentenced Bulatovi6 to four months imprisonment
suspended for a period of two years.
Leonidas Nshogoza, was an investigator for the defense in the case of
Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda. He was charged with contempt for
repeatedly meeting with prosecution witness GAA and potential witness A7/GEX,
and for attempting to procure false testimony. The Trial Chamber found Nshogoza
guilty on Counts 1 and 2 for knowingly and willfully violating protective orders
and sentenced him to ten months imprisonment. The Trial Chamber refused to
investigate Nshogoza's allegations of contempt by members of the prosecution.
Dragomir Pecanac, former Security and Intelligence Officer of the Main
Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska, was found guilty of contempt for
failing to comply with a subpoena ordering him to appear before the Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir and to show good cause for his non-compliance.
He was sentenced to three months imprisonment with credit for time served.
Ljubiga PetkoviW, former head of the war staff of Vojislav Segelj's Serb
Radical Party, was found guilty of contempt for refusing to comply with a
subpoena ordering him to appear as a prosecution witness in the case of Prosecutor
v. Vojislav Segelj. In his defense, Petkovi6 argued that it was unclear whether the
subpoena was addressed to him and that poor health prevented his compliance.
The Trial Chamber was unconvinced and sentenced Petkovi6 to four months
imprisonment with credit for time served.
Jelena Ragik, former case manager on the defense team for Milan Luki6, pled
guilty to five counts of contempt for bribing Zuhdija Tabakovi6 in order to provide
false testimony, inciting Tabakovi6 and others to offer bribes to potential
witnesses, and procuring false statements for two witnesses. The Trial Chamber
sentenced Ragi6 to twelve months imprisonment with eight months suspended and
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credit for time served.
Brima Samura, an investigator for the defense team for Tamba Brima, was
charged with contempt for allegedly disclosing the name and identity of protected
witness, TF1-023, in the case of Prosecutor against Alex Tamba Brima, Brima
Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Kanu, to the defendants' wives, Margaret Fomba
Brima and Neneh Binta Bah Jallow, in knowing violation of a court order. The
Trial Chamber found Samura not guilty of contempt, finding that the Independent
Counsel failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of actual
knowledge; i.e. that the disclosure was knowingly and willfully done in violation
of a Chamber order.
Eric Koi Senessie, former member of the Revolutionary United Front, was
found guilty of contempt for offering a bribe to Witness Kabbah, TFI-585, TF1-
516, and TFI-274, interfering with TF1-585, influencing Aruna Gbonda, and
attempting to influence TF 1-274 in order to recant their testimony in Prosecutor v.
Charles Ghankay Taylor.
Vojislav Seleij, former head of the war staff of Seelj's Serb Radical Party,
was the first person to be charged with contempt while on trial for crimes against
humanity and violations of the laws of war. Segelj was found guilty for knowingly
disclosing the identities of three witness in knowing violation of court orders in a
book he authored and published on his website. The Trial Chamber ordered Segelj
to withdraw the book from his website. After failing to comply with the court
order, Sekelj was found guilty of contempt two additional times and sentenced to
terms of imprisonment of eighteen months and two years, respectively.
Milan Simik and Branislav Avramovik, were charged with contempt for
alleged harassing and bribing a potential defense witness, Witness Agnes, to testify
on behalf of Milan Simi6. The Trial Chamber found that Witness Agnes's
testimony was uncorroborated and could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Milan Vujin, as lead counsel for Tadi6, was charged with knowingly and
wilfully interfering with the administration of justice by instructing witnesses to
make false statements, interfering with witness testimony, and bribery in the case
of Prosecutor v. Tadi6. Vujin was found guilty of contempt for putting forward a
case with statements he knew were false, and seeking to manipulate witnesses by
preventing them from naming names. He was found not guilty for attempting to
influence witness testimony through head signals and bribes. The Trial Chamber
imposed a fine of Dfl 15,000 and directed the Registrar to consider striking him
from the list of assigned counsel.
Zuhdija Tabakovit, pled guilty to knowingly and willfully interfering with
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the administration of justice by signing false statements provided to him by Jelena
Rasi6, former case manager of the Milan Luki6 defense team, for use in the Luki6
case, and by contacting two men identified by the pseudonyms 'X' and 'Y' who
agreed to sign false statements and introduce them to Rasi6. The Trial Chamber
sentenced Tabakovi6 to three months imprisonment with credit for time served.
Prince Taylor, son of Charles Gankay Taylor, was found guilty of knowingly
and willfully interfering with witnesses. Those witnesses were Mohammed Kabba
TFI-274, TFI-585, Aruna Gbonda, and Eric Senessie, who provided testimony in
the case of Prosecutor v. Taylor, to recant their previous testimony in that trial
through instructions to Eric Senessie. The Single Judge sentenced Taylor to two
and half years of imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber reversed the judgment on
the ground that a reasonable trier of fact could not have placed decisive weight on
Senessie's evidence.
Milan Tupajic, former chief of the crisis staff and President of the Serb
municipality of Sokolac, was charged with contempt for failing to comply, or show
good cause not to comply, with two subpoenas ordering him to testify as a witness
in the case of Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadi6. The Trial Chamber sentenced
Tupaji6 to two months imprisonment with credit for time served.
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A) Contempt of Court
i) Statutes
(a) ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 77:
Contempt of Court
1. The Tribunal in the exercise of its inherent power may hold in contempt
those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of
justice, including any person who
(i) being a witness before a Chamber, contumaciously refuses or
fails to answer a question;
(ii) discloses information relating to those proceedings in knowing
violation of an order of a Chamber; (Amended 4 Dec 1998)
(iii) without just excuse fails to comply with an order to attend before
or produce documents before a Chamber;
(iv) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or
otherwise interferes with, a witness who is giving, has given, or
is about to give evidence in proceedings before a Chamber, or a
potential witness; or
(Amended 4 Dec 1998, amended 13 Dec 2001)
(v) threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise seeks to
coerce any other person, with the intention of preventing that
other person from complying with an obligation under an order
of a Judge or Chamber.
(Amended 4 Dec 1998, amended 13 Dec 2001)
(Amended 10 July 1998, revised 12 Nov 1997, amended 13 Dec 2001)
2. Any incitement or attempt to commit any of the acts punishable under
paragraph (A) is punishable as contempt of the Tribunal with the same
penalties. (Amended 4 Dec 1998, amended 13 Dec 2001)
3. When a Chamber has reason to believe that a person may be in contempt of
the Tribunal, it may:
(i) direct the Prosecutor to investigate the matter with a view to the
preparation and submission of an indictment for contempt;
(ii) where the Prosecutor, in the view of the Chamber, has a conflict
of interest with respect to the relevant conduct, direct the
Registrar to appoint an amicus curiae to investigate the matter
and report back to the Chamber as to whether there are sufficient
grounds for instigating contempt proceedings; or
(iii) initiate proceedings itself.
(Revised 12 Nov 1997, amended 10 July 1998, amended 4 Dec 1998,
amended 13 Dec 2001)
4. If the Chamber considers that there are sufficient grounds to proceed
against a person for contempt, the Chamber may:
(i) in circumstances described in paragraph (C)(i), direct the
Prosecutor to prosecute the matter; or
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(ii) in circumstances described in paragraph (C)(ii) or (iii), issue an
order in lieu of an indictment and either direct amicus curiae to
prosecute the matter or prosecute the matter itself
(Amended 13 Dec 2001)
5. The rules of procedure and evidence in Parts Four to Eight shall apply
mutatis mutandis to proceedings under this Rule. (Amended 13 Dec 2001)
The time limit for entering a plea pursuant to Rule 62(A), disclosure
pursuant to Rule 66(A)(i), or filing of preliminary motions pursuant to
Rule 72(A) shall each not exceed ten days. (Amended 13 Dec 2001,
amended 22 July 2009)
6. Any person indicted for or charged with contempt shall, if that person
satisfies the criteria for determination of indigence established by the
Registrar, be assigned counsel in accordance with Rule 45. (Revised 12
Nov 1997, amended 13 Dec 2001)
7. The maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in
contempt of the Tribunal shall be a term of imprisonment not exceeding
seven years, or a fine not exceeding 100,000 Euros, or both. (Amended 4
Dec 1998, amended 1 Dec 2000 and 13 Dec 2000, amended 13 Dec 2001)
8. Payment of a fine shall be made to the Registrar to be held in a separate
account.
9. If a counsel is found guilty of contempt of the Tribunal pursuant to this
Rule, the Chamber making such finding may also determine that counsel
is no longer eligible to represent a suspect or accused before the Tribunal
or that such conduct amounts to misconduct of counsel pursuant to Rule
46, or both. (Amended 13 Dec 2001)
10. Any decision rendered by a Trial Chamber under this Rule shall be subject
to appeal. Notice of appeal shall be filed within fifteen days of filing of
the impugned decision. Where such decision is rendered orally, the notice
shall be filed within fifteen days of the oral decision, unless
(i) the party challenging the decision was not present or represented
when the decision was pronounced, in which case the time-limit
shall run from the date on which the challenging party is notified
of the oral decision; or
(ii) the Trial Chamber has indicated that a written decision will
follow, in which case the time-limit shall run from filing of the
written decision.
(Revised 12 Nov 1997, amended 10 July 1998, amended 4 Dec 1998,
amended 1 Dec 2000 and 13 Dec 2000)
11. In the case of decisions under this Rule by the Appeals Chamber sitting as
a Chamber of first instance, an appeal may be submitted in writing to the
President within fifteen days of the filing of the impugned decision. Such
appeal shall be decided by five different Judges as assigned by the
President. Where the impugned decision is rendered orally, the appeal
shall be filed within fifteen days of the oral decision, unless
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(i) the party challenging the decision was not present or represented
when the decision was pronounced, in which case the time-limit
shall run from the date on which the challenging party is notified
of the oral decision; or
(ii) the Appeals Chamber has indicated that a written decision will
follow, in which case the time-limit shall run from filing of the
written decision.
(Amended 12 July 2002)
(b) ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 77:
Contempt of the Tribunal
(A) The Tribunal in the exercise of its inherent power may hold in contempt
those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of
justice, including any person who
(i) being a witness before a Chamber, contumaciously refuses or
fails to answer a question;
(ii) discloses information relating to those proceedings in knowing
violation of an order of a Chamber;
(iii) without just excuse fails to comply with an order to attend before
or produce documents before a Chamber;
(iv) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or
otherwise interferes with, a witness who is giving, has given, or
is about to give evidence in proceedings before a Chamber, or a
potential witness; or
(v) threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise seeks to
coerce any other person, with the intention of preventing that
other person from complying with an obligation under an order
of a Judge or Chamber.
(B) Any incitement or attempt to commit any of the acts punishable under
paragraph (A) is punishable as contempt of the Tribunal with the same
penalties.
(C) When a Chamber has reason to believe that a person may be in contempt
of the Tribunal, it may:
(i) direct the Prosecutor to investigate the matter with a view to the
preparation and submission of an indictment for contempt;
(ii) where the Prosecutor, in the view of the Chamber, has a conflict
of interest with respect to the relevant conduct, direct the
Registrar to appoint an amicus curiae to investigate the matter
and report back to the Chamber as to whether there are sufficient
grounds for instigating contempt proceedings; or
(iii) initiate proceedings itself.
(D) If the Chamber considers that there are sufficient grounds to proceed
against a person for contempt, the Chamber may:
VOL. 44:2
CONTEMPT OF COURT: A DIGEST
(i) in circumstances described in paragraph (C) (i), direct the
Prosecutor to prosecute the matter; or
(ii) in circumstances described in paragraph (C) (ii) or (iii), issue an
order in lieu of an indictment and either direct amicus curiae to
prosecute the matter or prosecute the matter itself.
(E)The Rules of Procedure and Evidence in Parts Four to Eight shall apply
mutatis mutandis to proceedings under this Rule.
(F)Any person indicted for or charged with contempt shall, if that person
satisfies the criteria for determination of indigence established by the
Registrar, be assigned counsel in accordance with Rule 45.
(G) The maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in
contempt of the Tribunal shall be a term of imprisonment not exceeding
five years, or a fine not exceeding USD10,000, or both.
(H) Payment of a fine shall be made to the Registrar to be held in a separate
account.
(I) If a counsel is found guilty of contempt of the Tribunal pursuant to this
Rule, the Chamber making such finding may also determine that counsel
is no longer eligible to represent a suspect or accused before the Tribunal
or that such conduct amounts to misconduct of counsel pursuant to Rule
46, or both.
(J) Any decision rendered by a Trial Chamber under this Rule shall be subject
to appeal. Notice of appeal shall be filed within fifteen days of filing of
the impugned decision. Where such decision is rendered orally, the notice
shall be filed within fifteen days of the oral decision, unless:
(i) the party challenging the decision was not present or represented
when the decision was pronounced, in which case the time-limit
shall run from the date on which the challenging party is notified
of the oral decision; or
(ii) the Trial Chamber has indicated that a written decision will
follow, in which case the time-limit shall run from filing of the
written decision.
(K) In the case of decisions under this Rule by the Appeals Chamber sitting as
a Chamber of first instance, an appeal may be submitted in writing to the
President within fifteen days of the filing of the impugned decision. Such
appeal shall be decided by five different Judges as assigned by the
President. Where the impugned decision is rendered orally, the appeal
shall be filed within fifteen days of the oral decision, unless:
(i) the party challenging the decision was not present or represented
when the decision was pronounced, in which case the time-limit
shall run from the date on which the challenging party is notified
of the oral decision; or
(ii) the Appeals Chamber has indicated that a written decision will
follow, in which case the time-limit shall run from filing of the
written decision.
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(c) SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 77:
Contempt of the Special Court
(A) The Special Court, in the exercise of its inherent power, may punish for
contempt any person who knowingly and willfully interferes with its
administration ofjustice, including any person who:
(i) being a witness before a Chamber, subject to Rule 90(E) refuses
or fails to answer a question;
(ii) discloses information relating to proceedings in knowing
violation of an order of a Chamber;
(iii) without just excuse fails to comply with an order to attend before
or produce documents before a Chamber;
(iv) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or
otherwise interferes with, a witness who is giving, has given, or
is about to give evidence in proceedings before a Chamber, or a
potential witness;
(v) threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise seeks to
coerce any other person, with the intention of preventing that
other person from complying with an obligation under an order
of a Judge or Chamber; or
(vi) knowingly assists an accused person to evade the jurisdiction of
the Special Court.
(B) Any incitement or attempt to commit any of the acts punishable under
Sub-Rule (A) is punishable as contempt of the Special Court with the
same penalties.
(C) When a Judge or Trial Chamber has reason to believe that a person may
be in contempt of the Special Court, it may:
(i) deal with the matter summarily itself;
(ii) refer the matter to the appropriate authorities of Sierra Leone; or
(iii) direct the Registrar to appoint an experienced independent
counsel to investigate the matter and report back to the Chamber
as to whether there are sufficient grounds for instigating
contempt proceedings. If the Chamber considers that there are
sufficient grounds to proceed against a person for contempt, the
Chamber may issue an order in lieu of an indictment and direct
the independent counsel to prosecute the matter.
(D) Proceedings under Sub-Rule (C)(iii) above may be assigned to be heard
by a single judge of any Trial Chamber or a Trial Chamber.
(E)The rules of procedure and evidence in Parts IV to VIII shall apply, as
appropriate, to proceedings under this Rule.
(F)Any person indicted for or charged with contempt shall, if that person
satisfies the criteria for determination of indigence established by the
Registrar, be entitled to legal assistance in accordance with Rule 45.
(G) The maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in
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contempt of the Special Court pursuant to Sub-Rule (C)(i) shall be a term
of imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding 2
million Leones, or both; and the maximum penalty pursuant to Sub-Rule
(C)(iii) shall be a term of imprisonment for seven years or a fine not
exceeding 20 million leones, or both.
(H) Payment of a fine shall be made to the Registrar to be held in a separate
account.
(I) If a counsel is found guilty of contempt of the Special Court pursuant to
this Rule, the Chamber making such finding may also determine that
counsel is no longer eligible to appear before the Special Court or that
such conduct amounts to misconduct of counsel pursuant to Rule 46, or
both.
(J) Any conviction rendered under this Rule shall be subject to appeal.
(K) Appeals pursuant to this Rule shall be heard by a bench of at least three
Judges of the Appeals Chamber. In accordance with Rule 117 such
appeals may be determined entirely on the basis of written submissions.
(L)In the event of contempt occurring during proceedings before the Appeals
Chamber or a Judge of the Appeals Chamber, the matter may be dealt
with summarily from which there shall be no right of appeal or referred to
a Trial Chamber for proceedings in accordance with Sub-Rules (C) to (I)
above.
(d) Extraordinary Chambers Internal Rule 35 provides, in
relevant part:
1. The ECCC may sanction or refer to the appropriate authorities, any person
who knowingly and wilfully interferes with the administration of justice,
including any person who:
a) discloses confidential information in violation of an order of the Co-
Investigating Judges or the Chambers;
b) without just excuse, fails to comply with an order to attend, or
produce documents or other evidence before the Co-Investigating
Judges or the Chambers;
c) destroys or otherwise tampers in any way with any documents,
exhibits or other evidence in a case before the ECCC;
d) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or
otherwise interferes with a witness, or potential witness, who is
giving, has given, or may give evidence in proceedings before the
Co-Investigating Judges or a Chamber;
e) threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise seeks to coerce
any other person, with the intention of preventing that other person
from complying with an order of the Co-Investigating Judges or the
Chambers;
f) knowingly assists a Charged Person or Accused to evade the
jurisdiction of the ECCC; or
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g) incites or attempts to commit any of the acts set out above.
2. When the Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers have reason to believe
that a person may have committed any of the acts set out in sub-rule 1
above, they may:
a) deal with the matter summarily;
b) conduct further investigations to ascertain whether there are sufficient
grounds for instigating proceedings; or
c) refer the matter to the appropriate authorities of the Kingdom of
Cambodia or the United Nations.
[ ...]
4. Cambodian Law shall apply in respect of sanctions imposed on a person
found to have committed any act set out in sub-rule 1.
5. If a lawyer is found to have committed any act set out in sub-rule 1, the Co-
Investigating Judges or the Chambers making such finding may also
determine that such conduct amounts to misconduct of a lawyer pursuant
to Rule 38.
6. Any decision under this Rule shall be subject to appeal before the Pre-Trial
Chamber or the Supreme Court Chamber as appropriate. A notice of
appeal to the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be filed within 15 (fifteen) days of
the date of decision or of its notification, as appropriate. An appeal to the
Supreme Court Chamber shall be filed in compliance with Rules 105(2)
and 107(1).
(e) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
ARTICLE 70
Offences against the administration ofjustice
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over the following offences against its
administration ofjustice when committed intentionally:
(a) Giving false testimony when under an obligation pursuant to article
69, paragraph 1, to tell the truth;
(b) Presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged;
(c) Corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the
attendance or testimony of a witness, retaliating against a witness for
giving testimony or destroying, tampering with or interfering with the
collection of evidence;
(d) Impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official of the
Court for the purpose of forcing or persuading the official not to
perform, or to perform improperly, his or her duties;
(e) Retaliating against an official of the Court on account of duties
performed by that or another official;
(f) Soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official of the Court in
connection with his or her official duties.
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2. The principles and procedures governing the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction over offences under this article shall be those provided for in
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The conditions for providing
international cooperation to the Court with respect to its proceedings
under this article shall be governed by the domestic laws of the requested
State.
3. In the event of conviction, the Court may impose a term of imprisonment
not exceeding five years, or a fine in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, or both.
4. (a) Each State Party shall extend its criminal laws penalizing offences
against the integrity of its own investigative or judicial process to offences
against the administration of justice referred to in this article, committed
on its territory, or by one of its nationals;
(b) Upon request by the Court, whenever it deems it proper, the State Party
shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
Those authorities shall treat such cases with diligence and devote sufficient
resources to enable them to be conducted effectively.
ARTICLE 71
Sanctions for misconduct before the Court
1. The Court may sanction persons present before it who commit misconduct,
including disruption of its proceedings or deliberate refusal to comply
with its directions, by administrative measures other than imprisonment,
such as temporary or permanent removal from the courtroom, a fine or
other similar measures provided for in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
2. The procedures governing the imposition of the measures set forth in
paragraph 1 shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
(f) Special Tribunal for Lebanon Rules of Procedure and
Evidence
RULE 60 BIS
Contempt and Obstruction of Justice
(added 10 November 2010, amended and renumbered 20 February 2013)
(A) The Tribunal, in the exercise of its inherent power, may hold in contempt
those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of
justice, upon assertion of the Tribunal's jurisdiction according to the
Statute. This includes, but is not limited to, the power to hold in contempt
any person who:
(i) being a person who is questioned by or on behalf of a Party in
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circumstances not covered by Rule 152, knowingly and wilfully
makes a statement which the person knows is false and which the
person knows may be used as evidence in proceedings before the
Tribunal, provided that the statement is accompanied by a formal
acknowledgement by the person being questioned that he has
been made aware about the potential criminal consequences of
making a false statement;
(ii) being a witness before a Judge or Chamber refuses or fails to
answer a question without reasonable excuse including the
situation described in Rule 150(F);
(iii) discloses information relating to proceedings in knowing
violation of an order of a Judge or Chamber;
(iv) without reasonable excuse fails to comply with an order to
appear or produce documents before a Judge or Chamber;
(v) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or
otherwise interferes with, a witness who is giving, has given, or
is about to give evidence in proceedings before a Judge or
Chamber, or a potential witness;
(vi) threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise seeks to
coerce any other person, with the intention of preventing that
other person from complying with an obligation under an order
of a Judge or Chamber; or
(vii)threatens, intimidates, engages in serious public defamation of,
by statements that are untrue and the publication of which is
inconsistent with freedom of expression as laid down in
international human rights standards, offers a bribe to, or
otherwise seeks to coerce, a Judge or any other officer of the
Tribunal.
(B) Any incitement or attempt to commit any of the acts under paragraph (A)
is punishable as contempt of the Tribunal with the same penalties.
(C) The President shall designate a Contempt Judge in accordance with the
relevant Practice Direction to hear cases of contempt and obstruction of
justice. The Contempt Judge shall also hear cases under Rule 152.
(D) A Party believing that a person is in contempt under paragraph (A) (i)
may so inform the relevant Judge or Chamber, submitting, where
appropriate, supporting material. In other cases, a Party or any other
interested person may inform the Judge or Chamber of an allegation of
contempt or obstruction of justice. The Judge or Chamber shall refer the
matter to the President for referral to a Contempt Judge.
(E)When the Contempt Judge has reason to believe that a person may be in
contempt of the Tribunal, he may:
(i) invite the Prosecutor to consider investigating the matter with a
view to the preparation and submission of an indictment for
contempt;
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(ii) where the Prosecutor indicates a preference not to investigate the
matter or submit an indictment himself, or where in the view of
the Contempt Judge, the Prosecutor has a conflict of interest with
respect to the relevant conduct, direct the Registrar to appoint an
amicus curiae to investigate the matter and report back to the
Contempt Judge as to whether there are sufficient grounds for
instigating contempt proceedings; or
(iii) initiate proceedings himself.
(F)If the Contempt Judge considers that there are sufficient grounds to
proceed against a person for contempt, he may:
(i) in circumstances described in paragraph (E) (i), direct the
Prosecutor to prosecute the matter; or
(ii) in circumstances described in paragraph (E) (ii) or (iii), issue an
order in lieu of an indictment and either direct amicus curiae to
prosecute the matter or prosecute the matter himself.
(G) With respect to contempt under paragraph (A) (i), the Contempt Judge
shall undertake the steps in paragraph (E) or (F) only if there is prima
facie evidence that the alleged contempt has led to a material interference
with the administration ofjustice.
(H) The rules of procedure and evidence in Parts Four to Eight shall apply
mutatis mutandis to proceedings under this Rule.
(I) Any person indicted for or charged with contempt shall be afforded the
rights envisaged in Rule 69 and, if that person satisfies the criteria for
determination of indigence established by the Registrar, be assigned
counsel in accordance with Rule 59.
(J) The maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in
contempt of the Tribunal shall be a term of imprisonment not exceeding
seven years, or a fine not exceeding 100,000 Euros, or both.
(K) Payment of a fine shall be made to the Registrar to be held in a separate
account.
(L)If a counsel is found guilty of contempt of the Tribunal pursuant to this
Rule, a relevant Judge or Chamber may determine that counsel is no
longer eligible to represent a suspect or accused before the Tribunal, or
that such conduct amounts to misconduct of counsel pursuant to Rule 60,
or both.
(M) A decision of a Contempt Judge finalising a contempt case may be
appealed to a bench of three judges designated by the President in
accordance with the relevant Practice Direction. Notice of appeal shall be
filed within fifteen days of filing of the impugned decision. The
Appellant's brief shall be filed within fifteen days of filing of the notice of
appeal.
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(g) Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals Rules
of Procedure and Evidence
RULE 90
Contempt
(A) The Mechanism in the exercise of its inherent power may, with respect to
proceedings before the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism, hold in
contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with the
administration ofjustice, including any person who:
(i) being a witness before a Chamber or a Single Judge,
contumaciously refuses or fails to answer a question;
(ii) discloses information relating to those proceedings in knowing
violation of an order of a Chamber or a Single Judge;
(iii) without just excuse fails to comply with an order by a Chamber
or Single Judge, including an order to attend before or produce
documents before a Chamber or a Single Judge;
(iv) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury, or offers a bribe to, or
otherwise interferes with, a witness who is giving, has given, or
is about to give evidence in proceedings before a Chamber or a
Single Judge, or a potential witness; or
(v) threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise seeks to
coerce any other person, with the intention of preventing that
other person from complying with an obligation under an order
of a Chamber or a Single Judge.
(B) Any incitement or attempt to commit any of the acts punishable under
paragraph (A) is punishable as contempt of the ICTY, the ICTR, or the
Mechanism with the same penalties.
(C) When a Chamber or a Single Judge has reason to believe that a person
may be in contempt of the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism, it shall
refer the matter to the President who shall designate a Single Judge who
may:
(i) direct the Prosecutor to investigate the matter with a view to the
preparation and submission of an indictment for contempt;
(ii) where the Prosecutor, in the view of the Single Judge, has a
conflict of interest with respect to the relevant conduct, direct the
Registrar to appoint an amicus curiae to investigate the matter
and report back to the Single Judge as to whether there are
sufficient grounds for instigating contempt proceedings; or
(iii) initiate proceedings himself
(D) Subject to Article 6 of the Statute, if the Single Judge considers that there
are sufficient grounds to proceed against a person for contempt, the Single
Judge may:
(i) in circumstances described in paragraph (C)(i), direct the
Prosecutor to prosecute the matter; or
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(ii) in circumstances described in paragraph (C)(ii) or (iii), issue an
order in lieu of an indictment and either direct amicus curiae to
prosecute the matter or prosecute the matter.
(E)The Rules shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings under this Rule.
The time limit for entering a plea pursuant to Rule 64(A), disclosure
pursuant to Rule 71(A)(i), or filing of preliminary motions pursuant to
Rule 79(A) shall each not exceed ten days.
(F)Any person indicted for or charged with contempt shall, if that person
satisfies the criteria for determination of indigence established by the
Registrar, be assigned Counsel in accordance with Rule 43.
(G) The maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in
contempt shall be a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years, or a
fine not exceeding 50,000 Euros or the equivalent thereof, or both.
(H) Payment of a fine shall be made to the Registrar to be held in a separate
account.
(I) If a Counsel is found guilty of contempt of the ICTY, the ICTR, or the
Mechanism pursuant to this Rule, the Single Judge making such finding
may also determine that Counsel is no longer eligible to represent a
suspect or accused before the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism or that
such conduct amounts to misconduct of counsel pursuant to Rule 47, or
both.
(J) Any decision disposing of a contempt case rendered by a Single Judge
under this Rule shall be subject to appeal as of right. Notice of appeal
shall be filed within fifteen days of filing of the impugned decision.
Where such decision is rendered orally, the notice shall be filed within
fifteen days of the oral decision, unless:
(i) the Party challenging the decision was not present or represented
when the decision was pronounced, in which case the time-limit
shall run from the date on which the challenging Party is notified
of the oral decision; or
(ii) the Single Judge has indicated that a written decision will follow,
in which case the time-limit shall run from filing of the written
decision.
The appellant shall file an appeal brief within fifteen days after filing the
notice of appeal. The respondent shall file a response within ten days of the filing
of the appeal brief, and the appellant may file a reply within four days of the filing
of the response.
ii) General elements
(a) inherent power to hold in contempt
(i) to prevent frustration of jurisdiction, and to
safeguard judicial functions
Tadi6, (Appeals Chamber), January 31, 2000, para. 13: "There is no mention
in the Tribunal's Statute of its power to deal with contempt. The Tribunal does,
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however, possess an inherent jurisdiction, deriving from its judicial function, to
ensure that its exercise of the jurisdiction which is expressly given to it by that
Statute is not frustrated and that its basic judicial functions are safeguarded. As an
international criminal court, the Tribunal must therefore possess the inherent
power to deal with conduct which interferes with its administration of justice. The
content of that inherent power may be discerned by reference to the usual sources
of international law."
Tadi6, (Appeals Chamber), January 31, 2000, para. 18: "A power in the
Tribunal to punish conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice or abuse its
administration of justice is a necessity in order to ensure that its exercise of the
jurisdiction which is expressly given to it by its Statute is not frustrated and that its
basic judicial functions are safeguarded. Thus the power to deal with contempt is
clearly within its inherent jurisdiction."
Chea, (Trial Chamber), May 11, 2012, para. 21: "[T]he purpose of prohibiting
conduct which tends to prejudice the administration of justice is to ensure that the
exercise of a court's jurisdiction is not frustrated and that its basic judicial
functions are safeguarded. This clearly requires that outside actors refrain from
seeking to influence a court's judges or from acting in a way that could be
perceived as an attempt to do so. Given the significance of these principles to the
proper functioning of the judiciary, courts have usually sought to reaffirm them
whenever comments are made that appear to contravene the presumption of
innocence, even where no issues of criminal responsibility arise."
Chea, (Supreme Court Chamber), April 27, 2012, para. 30: "As
internationally firmly established, the power to deal with contempt - that is, with
interference with the administration ofjustice - accrues to any court by virtue of its
judicial role, and 'is necessary to ensure that the Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction
is not frustrated and its basic judicial functions are safeguarded.' It is therefore of
utmost importance that throughout the entire course of proceedings judges retain
the power 'to take measures necessary to ensure the integrity of proceedings,
which ultimately maintain respect for justice.' Were any of the ECCC judicial
organs not entrusted with this fundamental prerogative, the Court would be unable
to guarantee a fair trial to an accused and thus properly fulfil its mission."
Krstie, (Trial Chamber), July 18, 2013, para. 16: "Although contempt of court
is not expressly articulated in the Statute of the Tribunal ("Statute"), it is well
established that the Tribunal possesses an inherent power, deriving from its judicial
function, to ensure that its exercise of the jurisdiction expressly bestowed to it by
the Statute is not frustrated and that its basic functions are safeguarded. The
Tribunal therefore possesses an inherent power to deal with conduct interfering
with its administration of justice."
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(ii) conduct that interferes with the administration of
justice
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 30: "As an international
criminal court, the Tribunal possesses the inherent power to deal with conduct
which interferes with its administration of justice. Such interference may be by
way of conduct which obstructs, prejudices or abuses the Tribunal's administration
of justice. Those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with the Tribunal's
administration of justice in such a way may therefore be held in contempt of the
Tribunal."
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 36: "Both the purpose
and the scope of the law of contempt to be applied by this Tribunal is to punish
conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice or abuse its administration of justice in
order to ensure that its exercise of the jurisdiction which is expressly given to it by
its Statute is not frustrated and that its basic judicial functions are safeguarded."
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 9: "The explicit reference in the
Rules to the Tribunal's inherent power to hold in contempt those who knowingly
and wilfully interfere with its administration of justice was made in accordance
with the terms of Article 15 of the Tribunal's Statute ("Statute"), which mandates
the judges of the Tribunal to adopt the Tribunal's Rules. The power to provide for
contempt is not expressly mentioned in the Statute of the Tribunal but is part of the
inherent powers of judges to deal with any issues necessary for the conduct of
matters falling within their jurisdiction. The Tribunal's Chambers have
consistently affirmed the Tribunal's inherent power, which exists independently of
any statutory reference, to punish conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice or
abuse the Tribunal's administration of justice. This power is necessary to ensure
that the Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction is not frustrated and its basic judicial
functions are safeguarded. The Rules express only the general contours of the
offense of contempt."
Marijai6 and Rebie, (Appeals Chamber), September 27, 2006, para. 23:
"[Plursuant to Rule 77 and in accordance with its consistent jurisprudence, the
International Tribunal possesses an inherent power to deal with conduct interfering
with its administration of justice. It has thus been explicitly held that the
International Tribunal has both the subject matter and personal jurisdiction to
prosecute contempt."
PetkoviW, (Trial Chamber), September 11, 2008, para. 25: "[T]he necessity to
punish all conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice or abuse the administration of
justice is intended to ensure that the exercise of the jurisdiction which is expressly
given to it by the Statute is not frustrated and that its basic judicial functions are
safeguarded."
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Ayyash et al., (Contempt Judge), April 29, 2013, para. 12: "Rule 60 bis allows
the Tribunal to hold accountable those who knowingly and willingly interfere with
its administration of justice. This includes those who disclose information relating
to proceedings in knowing violation of a judicial order, those who threaten and
intimidate witnesses, and those who threaten, intimidate, or seek to coerce persons
from complying with an obligation under a judicial order. An individual who
commits, attempts to commit, or incites others to commit these acts is guilty of
contempt of this Tribunal or obstruction of justice." See also New TV S.A.L. and
Al Khayat, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para. 9; Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and
Al Amin, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para. 9.
(iii) sources of international law on contempt
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 30: "The content of that
inherent power, however, must be discerned by reference to the usual sources of
international law, and not by reference to the wording of Rule 77, although the
Appeals Chamber held that each of the formulations in the current Rules 77(A) to
(D), when interpreted in the light of that statement of the Tribunal's inherent
power, falls within - but does not limit - that inherent power, as each clearly
amounts to knowingly and wilfully interfering with the Tribunal's administration
ofjustice."
1. London Charter/International Military
Tribunals
Tadie, (Appeals Chamber), January 31, 2000, para. 13: "There is no specific
customary international law directly applicable to this issue. There is an
international analogue available, by way of conventional international law, in the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (an annexure to the 1945 London
Agreement) which gave to that tribunal the power to deal summarily with 'any
contumacy' by 'imposing appropriate punishment, including exclusion of any
Defendant or his Counsel from some or all further proceedings, but without
prejudice to the determination of the charges."'
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 10: "The inherent power of an
international court to deal with any issues necessary for the conduct of matters
falling within its jurisdiction has been affirmed by other international courts.
Article 18(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (an annex to the
8 August 1945 London Agreement) gave the Military Tribunal power to deal
summarily with 'any contumacy' by 'imposing appropriate punishment.' The
United States Military Tribunals sitting in Nuremberg (and acting in accordance
with the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945, which
incorporated the Charter of the International Military Tribunal) interpreted their
judicial power as including the power to punish contempt of court and dealt with
three contempt matters."
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2. International Court of Justice
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 11: "The International Court of
Justice, in the Northern Cameroons case in 1963 and then in the Nuclear Tests
Case in 1974, reiterated the existence of the inherent jurisdiction of an
international judicial organ 'enabling it to take such action as may be required, on
the one hand to ensure that the exercise of its jurisdiction over the merits, if and
when established, shall not be frustrated, and on the other, to provide for the
orderly settlement of all matters in dispute to ensure the observance of the
"inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function" of the Court, and to
"maintain its judicial character" (Northern Cameroons, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports
1963, at p. 29). Such inherent jurisdiction, on the basis of which the Court is fully
empowered to make whatever findings may be necessary for the purposes just
indicated, derives from the mere existence of the Court as a judicial organ
established by the consent of States, and is conferred upon it in order to that its
basic judicial functions may be safeguarded."'
3. common and civil law
Tadi6, (Appeals Chamber), January 31, 2000, para. 15: "Historically, the law
of contempt originated as, and has remained, a creature of the common law. The
general concept of contempt is said to be unknown to the civil law, but many civil
law systems have legislated to provide offences which produce a similar result."
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 40: "[T]he offence of
contempt (at least so far as the common law is concerned) is a protean one. It is
concerned with many widely diverse types of conduct and, for different types of
conduct to amount to contempt, different states of mind are required."
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 41: "[T]he law of
contempt originated as, and has remained, a creature of the common law and, as a
general concept, is unknown to the civil law. It is therefore to the common law
that reference must initially be made to determine the scope of the law of contempt
- recognising of course that an international tribunal such as this Tribunal must
take into account its different setting within the basic structure of the international
community."
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 12: "The power of a court to
hold in contempt of court those who interfere with its administration of justice is a
well established principle both in major common law and civil law legal systems,
and it is based on the postulate that no judge may deliver justice without
possessing the necessary power to deal with ancillary matters in order to ensure the
integrity of judicial proceedings. In common law systems these powers exist
independently of legal codification and in civil law legal systems such power is
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exercised on the basis of a codified reference."
(iv) not designed to buttress mere affronts or insults
Tadi6, (Appeals Chamber), January 31, 2000, para. 16: "[T]he law of
contempt as developed at common law is not designed to buttress the dignity of the
judges or to punish mere affronts or insults to a court or tribunal; rather, it is justice
itself which is flouted by a contempt of court, not the individual court or judge who
is attempting to administer justice."
PetkoviW, (Trial Chamber), September 11, 2008, para. 26: "[T]he rules
applicable to contempt are not intended to buttress the dignity of the judges or to
punish mere affronts or insults to a court or tribunal; rather, it is justice itself which
is flouted by a contempt of court, not the court or judge who is attempting to
administer justice."
(v) Rule 77 does not limit the Tribunal's inherent power
over contempt
Tad6, (Appeals Chamber), January 31, 2000, para. 12: "Contempt of the
Tribunal is dealt with in Rule 77 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. That Rule identifies a number of specific situations which are stated to
constitute contempt of the Tribunal, but Rule 77(E) provides: Nothing in this Rule
affects the inherent power of the Tribunal to hold in contempt those who
knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration ofjustice."
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 38: "The Tribunal's
inherent power to deal with contempt has necessarily existed ever since its
creation, and the extent of that power has not altered by reason of the amendments
made to the Tribunal's Rules, or by reason of its decisions interpreting or
clarifying that power."
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 39: "[T]he formulations
in Rule 77 of various situations which amount to contempt do not limit the
Tribunal's inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt."
(vi) judges may adopt rules of procedure and evidence
Tadi, (Appeals Chamber), January 31, 2000, para. 24: "Care must be taken
not to treat the considerable amount of elaboration which has occurred in relation
to Rule 77 over the years as if it has produced a statutory form of offence enacted
by the judges of the Tribunal, notwithstanding the form in which Sub-rules (A) to
(D) may be expressed. Article 15 of the Tribunal's Statute gives power to the
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judges to adopt only-
[ ... ] rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-
trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission
of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other
appropriate matters.
That power does not permit rules to be adopted which constitute new
offences, but it does permit the judges to adopt rules ofprocedure and evidence for
the conduct of matters falling within the inherent jurisdiction of the Tribunal as
well as matters within its statutory jurisdiction."
(vii)adheres to the principle of legality
Tadi6, (Appeals Chamber), January 31, 2000, para. 24: "That power does not
permit rules to be adopted which constitute new offences, but it does permit the
judges to adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of matters falling
within the inherent jurisdiction of the Tribunal as well as matters within its
statutory jurisdiction."
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 14: "[T]he Chamber endorses
the Appeals Chamber's statement in the Kordi6 and Cerkez case that 'the nullem
crimen sine lege principle does not require that an accused knew the specific legal
definition of each element of a crime he committed."'
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. andAl Amin, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para.
12: "It has been argued that, while an international tribunal undoubtedly has
inherent power to make rules governing the prosecution of contempt, prosecuting
as contempt conduct not explicitly prohibited in the rules is inconsistent with the
principle of legality. I agree, however, with the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
that holding in contempt any knowing and wilful interference with a tribunal's
administration of justice comports with the principle of legality. In any event,
international case-law provides adequate notice that deliberate interference with
the administration of justice, expressed in general terms, is an indictable offence.
That determining the exact content of the tribunal's power requires 'reference to
the usual sources of international law' is perfectly compatible with due process.
As a matter of common sense, intentionally broadcasting or publishing information
about purportedly confidential witnesses potentially constitutes such interference."
See also New TV S.A.L. and Al Khayat, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para.
12.
(viii)authority to investigate contempt
Nyiramasuhuko et al., November 30, 2001. para. 8: "[T]he Tribunal's
competence to address contempt is not exclusively vested in its Chambers, the
parties also benefit from this competence. Indeed, as officers of the court, they
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have a duty not only to report to the Chamber on conduct affecting the
administration of justice which comes to their notice, but also to carry on
investigations in order to support their allegations by facts."
(b) liability for contempt
(i) standard of proof
1. legal entities
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 67: "In light of the
above and for the following reasons, I conclude that it is most appropriate in the
circumstances to look to Lebanese law on corporate liability."
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 72: "Thus, inferring
from Lebanese law, in order for the corporate Accused to be held criminally
responsible for either count, the prosecution must: (1) establish the criminal
responsibility of a specific natural person; (2) demonstrate that, at the relevant
time, such natural person was a director, member of the administration,
representative (someone authorized by the legal person to act in its name) or an
employee/worker (who must have been provided by the legal body with explicit
authorization to act in its name) of the corporate Accused; and (3) prove that the
natural person's criminal conduct was done either (a) on behalf of or (b) using the
means of the corporate Accused."
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Al Amin, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para.
19: "On its face, Rule 60 bis neither embraces nor rejects such liability in the
contempt context. Rather, it simply affirms the Tribunal's inherent power to hold in
contempt 'those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of
justice' and details what must be done when a Contempt Judge 'has reason to
believe that a person may be in contempt of the Tribunal.' No other provision of
Rule 60 bis in terms limits the Rule's application to natural persons. Notably, Rule
60 bis (J), which sets forth the maximum permissible penalties for contempt,
allows for the imposition of a monetary fine as a stand-alone penalty. The mere
fact that the Rule contemplates imprisonment as one possible penalty, a penalty
uniquely applicable to natural persons, does not therefore exclude punishment of
legal persons by other means. Further, because Rule 60 bis (H) makes Parts Four
to Eight of the Rules applicable to Rule 60 his proceedings mutatis mutandis, an
interpretation appropriate to the contempt context is required. On a literal
interpretation any such Rules could be compatible with a proceeding implicating a
legal person." See also New TV S.A.L. and Al Khayat, (Contempt Judge), January
31, 2014, para. 19.
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Al Amin, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para.
24: "[I]n order to ensure the administration of justice consonant with Article 28,
Rule 60 bis must be read to cover acts of contempt allegedly undertaken by legal
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persons. Under the highest procedural standards, corporate entities cannot be any
more entitled than natural persons to interfere with the judicial process." See also
New TVS.A.L. andAl Khayat, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para. 24.
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Al Amin, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para.
27: "The international trend toward criminal liability for legal persons further
supports the case for such liability, which has developed over the past two
centuries with recent adoption by civil law States, notably France, whose legal
system has underlain much of Lebanon's. As legal persons, and in particular the
limited liability company, have assumed ever greater prominence as actors in legal
and commercial affairs, domestic jurisdictions have progressively recognized the
need to hold them criminally accountable for their conduct. In the mid-19th
century, Lord Denman CJ stated that, '[t]here can be no effectual means for
deterring from an oppressive exercise of power for the purpose of gain, except the
remedy by an indictment against those who truly commit it, that is, the corporation
acting by its majority."' See also New TV S.A.L. and Al Khayat, (Contempt
Judge), January 31, 2014, para. 27.
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Al Amin, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para.
28: "This reasoning is the more powerful today, and particularly in the contempt
context, where corporate entities hold great power in their ability to publicly
broadcast and otherwise disseminate information. It would not only be naive but
dangerous to accept that only natural persons can interfere with the administration
of justice. To limit criminal liability for contempt to individual natural persons
risks undermining the justice process; for the actual and most powerful culprits of
any proved interference with justice would go untried. Accepting such an
approach here would be contrary to the purpose of Rule 60 bis in light of Article
28 of the Statute and the international trend embracing corporate criminal liability.
Applying the law of contempt to legal persons reflects the highest procedural
standards. I decline to impute to the Plenary an intention to immunize legal
persons against liability for interfering with due process. I conclude that Rule 60
bis extends to acts of contempt allegedly undertaken by legal persons." See also
New TVS.A.L. andAl Khayat, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para. 28.
2. judges
Sary, (Pre-Trial Chamber), March 29, 2010, para. 13: "[T]here are no
provisions in procedural rules established at the international level and it further
has not found any jurisprudence from international tribunals which provides for
jurisdiction to sanction judges for behavior amounting to interference with the
administration of justice. Similarly to the provisions in the ECCC the only
provisions concerning the acts of judges in their cases can be challenged in an
application for disqualification. The provisions in the Internal Rules are there
consistent with international standards."
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Sary, (Supreme Court Chamber), April 17, 2012, para. 14: "[T]he
jurisprudence has not conclusively explained whether judges are in effect immune
from jurisdiction under Internal Rule 35 or whether certain categories of judicial
conduct are excluded from the provision's ratione materiae. In that regard, the
Chamber notes that the language of Internal Rule 35 does not expressly exempt
any category of individual and indeed applies to 'any person.'. By contrast, by
specifying the content of 'interference with the administration of justice' in
subparagraphs (a) through (f), the rule clearly contemplates limits on the spheres of
conduct to which it applies. Therefore a judge is at least in principle within the
jurisdiction of Internal Rule 35, provided that her alleged conduct rises to the level
of an interference with the administration of justice within the meaning of that
Rule."
Sary, (Supreme Court Chamber), April 17, 2012, para. 18: "Internal Rule 35
applies to 'any person' whose conduct which 'interferes with the administration of
justice.' Although examples of such conduct are provided in subparagraphs (a)
through (f), the word 'including' in the introductory clause of Internal Rule 35(1)
indicates that this list is not exhaustive."
(c) conduct punishable as contempt does have limits
Sary, (Supreme Court Chamber), April 17, 2012, para. 19: "However, the
scope of Internal Rule 35 is not limitless. Each of the specific prohibitions set out
in Internal Rules 35(a) through (f) entails an effort to frustrate the mandate or
functioning of the Court. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) concern non-compliance with
an order of the Court. Paragraphs (c) and (d) concern interference with the
evidence to be given in proceedings before the Court. Paragraph () concerns
assistance to an accused person to evade the jurisdiction of the Court. In
accordance with the esjudem generis rule of statutory construction, only conduct
that is analogous to these enumerated grounds should be considered to be within
the scope of Internal Rule 35. This analysis is supported by the plain meaning of
the phrase 'interference with the administration of justice,' which suggests an
effort to obstruct the functioning or execution of court proceedings."
Chea (Supreme Court Chamber), September 14, 2012, para. 34: "Each of the
specific prohibitions set out in Rule 35(l)(a) through (g) entails an effort to
frustrate the mandate and functioning of the Court. Sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (e)
concern noncompliance with an order of the Court. Sub-paragraphs (c) and (d)
address interference with evidence to be given in proceedings before the Court.
Sub-paragraph (f) governs assistance to an accused person for purposes of evading
the jurisdiction of the Court. In accordance with the ejusdem generis rule of
statutory construction, only conduct analogous to these enumerated grounds should
be considered to be within the scope of Rule 35."
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(d) mens rea
(i) knowingly and willfully interfering with the
administration of justice
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 30: "[T]he Tribunal
possesses the inherent power to deal with conduct which interferes with its
administration of justice ... Those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with the
Tribunal's administration of justice in such a way may therefore be held in
contempt of the Tribunal."
Nshogoza, July 7, 2009, para. 155: "Rule 77 (A) provides the general actus
reus and mens rea for contempt. The actus reus is interference with the
administration of justice, and the mens rea is the knowledge and will to interfere."
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), July 7, 2009, para. 174: "The Chamber considers
that the plain language of the Rule dictates that any deliberate (knowing and
wilful) conduct that interferes with the administration of justice is sufficiently
serious to be punished as contempt."
Chea, (Supreme Court Chamber), September 14, 2012, para. 37: "Under Rule
35(1), proscribed conduct must be 'knowing and willful.' Strict liability is not
foreseen. In other words, there is no liability under Rule 35 on the basis of an
objective fact itself and irrespective of whether the conduct in question stems from
direct intent, indifference or the lack of realisation of the nature and/or
consequences of the conduct. Indeed, the procedural options available to the Court
pursuant to Rule 35(2) refer to 'a person [who] may have committed any of the
acts set out in sub-rule I.' Rule 35(4), likewise, speaks of 'sanctions imposed on a
person found to have committed any act set out in sub-rule .' Thus, pursuant to
the plain language of Rule 35, the whole regime is designed to provide a punitive
response, that is, sanction or referral to appropriate authorities of a person
attributed with intent to interfere with the administration of justice."
Ngirabatware, (Trial Chamber), February 21, 2013, para. 4: "Pursuant to Rule
77(A)(i)-(v) of the Rules, the Tribunal may hold in contempt those who knowingly
and wilfully interfere with its administration of justice. Rule 77(A)(iv) provides
that this includes any person who 'threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or
offers a bribe to, or otherwise interferes with, a witness who is giving, has given,
or is about to give evidence in proceedings before a Chamber, or a potential
witness.' In addition, Rule 77(B) provides that '[ajny incitement or attempt to
commit any of [these acts] is punishable as contempt of the Tribunal with the same
penalties."'
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(ii) specific intent to interfere with the administration of
justice
1. required
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 22: "For each actus reus
encompassed by Rule 77(A), the Prosecution must establish that the accused acted
wilfully and knowingly, that is with specific intent to interfere with the Tribunal's
administration of justice. Such intent may be separately proved or inferred from
the facts of each case."
Brdjanin, (Trial Chamber), March 19, 2004, para. 16: "There are differences
in the states of mind required for each of the various types of conduct envisaged in
Rule 77(A). The mens rea has to be established on a case by case basis in relation
to each of the conducts referred to in Rule 77(A)(i) to (v). For each form of
criminal contempt, the Prosecution must establish that the accused acted with
specific intent to interfere with the Tribunal's due administration ofjustice."
Brdjanin, (Trial Chamber), March 19, 2004, para. 24: "As to the mens rea of
the offence of intimidation of a witness as contempt of court, the Prosecution must
establish that the accused had knowledge that his conduct is likely to intimidate a
witness. Proof is also required that the accused acted with the specific intent to
interfere with the Tribunal's due administration of justice."
Chea, (Trial Chamber), May 11, 2012, para. 22: "Where criminal culpability
is alleged, the threshold for intervention by a Chamber is higher. In this regard, a
person may be found liable for interference with the administration of justice and
sanctions imposed only where it is shown that the individual in question has
'knowingly and wilfully' interfered or attempted to interfere with the
administration of justice. ICTY Rule 77(A) contains an equivalent provision,
which ICTY Trial Chambers have interpreted to require proof of "specific intent to
interfere with the Tribunal's administration of justice.' The Chamber agrees with
this interpretation and adopts it in respect of Internal Rule 35(1). For the reasons
that follow, no issue of criminal culpability arises in this case pursuant to this sub-
rule."
Samura, (Trial Chamber), October 26, 2005, para. 18: "Rule 77(A) provides
specifically that any person may be punished for contempt for knowingly and
wilfully interfering with the administration of justice. I am of the view that the
mens rea requirement of 'knowingly and wilfully' does apply to those various
types of conduct listed under Rule 77 and forms part of the specific intent."
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2. not required
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 53:
"The Chamber, however, considers this jurisprudence to have been developed by
the more recent Appeals Chamber rulings that a violation of a Chamber's order as
such interferes with the Tribunal's administration of justice. This Chamber
considers that any knowing and wilful conduct in violation of a Chamber's order
meets the requisite mens rea for contempt and is committed with the requisite
intent to interfere with the administration of justice."
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 55:
"[T]he definition of mens rea for conduct under Rule 77(A)(ii) as including an
additional element, i.e. the 'specific intent to interfere with the administration of
justice,' [is] an erroneous characterisation of the law."
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2009, para. 27: "[T]he mens rea element for
the form of commission of contempt charged under Rule 77(A)(ii) is solely the
knowledge of the alleged contemnor that his disclosure of a particular piece of
information is done in violation of an order of a Chamber. Therefore, the Amicus
Prosecutor was not required to demonstrate that the Accused had intended to
intimidate the Protected Witnesses by disclosing their identities."
(e) actus reus
(i) conduct that interferes with the administration
of justice
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 30: "[T]he Tribunal
possesses the inherent power to deal with conduct which interferes with its
administration of justice. Such interference may be by way of conduct which
obstructs, prejudices or abuses the Tribunal's administration of justice."
1. conduct that undermines confidence in
protective measures
Marijai6 and Rebi6, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 50: "Any
deliberate conduct which creates a real risk that confidence in the Tribunal's ability
to grant effective protective measures would be undermined amounts to a serious
interference with the administration of justice. Public confidence in the
effectiveness of such orders is absolutely vital to the success of the work of the
Tribunal."
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2. conduct that undermines tribunal's
legitimacy
Chea, (Supreme Court Chamber), September 14, 2012, para. 35: "The
Supreme Court Chamber further observes that the significance of a particular act's
interference with the administration of justice under Rule 35(1) is measured by its
abstract as well as by its concrete impact. Actual interference with the course of
proceedings is not necessary where the conduct undermines the Court's legitimacy
with the parties and the general public."
3. conduct that undermines tribunal's
appearance of independence and
impartiality
Chea, (Supreme Court Chamber), September 14, 2012, para. 36: "[A]ctions
undermining the independence and impartiality of ECCC judges, such as exerting
pressure, constitute interference prohibited under Rule 35(1). Other prohibited
conduct may include causing disorder in the courtroom, harassing Court officials
and staff, undermining the logistical functioning of the Court, and otherwise
bringing about circumstances that damage the Court's appearance of independence
or impartiality. Notably, damaging the Court's appearance of independence and
impartiality is interference as such, not merely an 'appearance of interference."'
(ii) Rule 77 conduct punishable as contempt is non-
exhaustive
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 38: "This count does
not fall under one of the specific types of conduct listed in Rule 60 bis (A) (i)-(vii).
However, as I have held and the Appeal Panel confirmed, Rule 60 bis (A)
explicitly contemplates prosecution for conduct beyond that which is listed. Any
conduct charged under Rule 60 bis (A) must, if proven, amount to a knowing and
wilful interference with the Tribunal's administration of justice. The particular
actus reus and mens rea will depend on the charge in each case."
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 21: "Rule 77(A)(iv) gives a list
of possible actus reus of the offence of contempt of court as follows: threat,
intimidation, causing of injury, offering of a bribe and otherwise interfering with a
witness or a potential witness. The expression 'otherwise interfering with a
witness or a potential witness' is an indication that Rule 77 gives a non-exhaustive
list of modes of commission of contempt of the Tribunal."
Samura, (Trial Chamber), October 26, 2005, para. 16: "[T]his inherent power
subsists independently of the specific terms of Rule 77 of the Rules. Therefore,
Rule 77 must be read in that context and therefore I am of the opinion that Rule 77
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does not, and was not intended to, limit the Special Court's inherent contempt of
court powers. As such, Rule 77(A) identifies and describes certain conduct
relating to the offense of contempt of court throughout a defined, though non-
exhaustive list of acts."
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 13: "Although Rule 77 of
the Rules enumerates specific acts of contempt, the list it provides is non-
exhaustive, as the formulations in Rule 77 of various situations which amount to
contempt do not limit the Tribunal's inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt."
MargetiW, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 14: "Rule 77(A) of the
Rules does not contain any legal or factual elements separate from Rules 77(A)(ii)
and 77(A)(iv) of the Rules in that Rule 77(A) contains both the material element
[i.e. interference with the administration of justice] and the mental element [i.e.
knowledge and wilfulness] of the offence of contempt whereas sub-Rules 77(A)(ii)
and 77(A)(iv) are non-exhaustive examples of the material elements by which the
offence of contempt is constituted. Therefore, if the Prosecution establishes a
sufficiently clear factual basis for an accused's liability under Rule 77(A)(ii) or
Rule 77(A)(iv) of the Rules, it has automatically established a sufficiently clear
basis for an accused's liability under Rule 77."
MargetiW, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 64: "Rule 77(A)(iv) of the
Rules gives a non-exhaustive sub-list of possible forms of actus reus of the offence
of contempt of the Tribunal, including 'threat, intimidation, causing of injury,
offering of a bribe and otherwise interfering with a witness or a potential witness."'
Milo&evi6, (Trial Chamber), July 18, 2011, para. 11: "None of the enumerated
acts apply to the present situation. However the list of acts contained in Rule 77
(A) (i)-(v) of the Rules is not exhaustive, merely representing examples of acts
interfering with the Tribunal's administration of justice. Accordingly, contempt
can also be committed through knowingly and willfully interfering with the
Tribunal's administration of justice in other ways. The meaning of the term
'administration of justice' in Rule 77 of the Rules is to be interpreted in light of the
enumerated actiis rei in Rule 77 (A), which concern matters closely related to the
functioning of the judicial proceedings before the Tribunal."
(iii) includes non-criminal offenses
Chea, (Supreme Court Chamber), September 14, 2012, para. 33: "[T]he
Supreme Court Chamber must determine the normative import of Rule 35(1). ...
this sub-rule articulates, by way of illustration, an array of conduct which may
qualify as an interference with the administration of justice. It does not purport to
define proscribed conduct exhaustively, nor is it limited in scope by reference to
the Cambodian Criminal Code. Such open-ended construction demonstrates that
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the notion of interference under Rule 35 is broad, and acts falling thereunder may
or may not be criminal in nature. . . . Rule 35, in conjunction with Rule 21,
contemplates procedures addressing both crimes against the administration of
justice (as defined in the criminal statutes of Cambodia) and non-criminal offences
against the administration of justice. Absent relevant Cambodian law, it ultimately
falls on the ECCC Judges and Chambers to determine those non-criminal offenses
that fall within the scope of Rule 35."
Chea, (Supreme Court Chamber), September 14, 2012, para. 38: "[T]o the
extent Rule 35 applies to non-criminal acts, the intent element remains to be
defined so as to encompass culpability as is appropriate to effecting the protection
that the proscription seeks to establish. In this regard, we consider that the
requirement of specific intent construed by ICTY Trial Chambers for criminal
contempt of court is too strict for administrative offences. Rather, it is sufficient to
establish that the conduct which constituted the violation was deliberate and not
accidental. However, acts that prima facie lack the requisite intent are excluded
from the ambit of Rule 35 barring the initiation of proceedings or application of
sanctions."
(iv) seriousness of conduct has minimal probative
value
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), July 7, 2009, para. 174: "The Chamber notes that
the plain language of Rule 77 makes no mention of a 'gravity threshold' or
'sufficiently serious conduct.' Rather it states that the Tribunal 'may hold in
contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of
justice."'
Nshogoza, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2010, para. 57: "Considerations of
the gravity of an accused's conduct or his underlying motivations are rather to be
assessed in connection with the decision to initiate proceedings or in
sentencing...the minimal gravity surrounding a violation of a Chamber's order
should be understood, not as a finding that the conduct was not contempt, but as an
exercise of the discretion of the Chamber not to initiate proceedings in such
circumstances."
Chea, (Trial Chamber), May 11, 2012, para. 30. "The principles contained in
Internal Rule 87(1) and the relevant international jurisprudence establish that
criminal sanctions may only be imposed against an individual where it is shown
that he or she knowingly and wilfully interfered with the administration of justice."
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iii) Underlying offenses
(1) 'contumaciously refuses or fails to answer questions'
(a) mens rea
(i) knowingly and willfully interfering with the
administration of justice
Milogevi6, (Trial Chamber), May 13, 2005, para. 16: "[T]he test of
"knowingly and wilfully" interfering with the Tribunal's administration of justice
by 'contumaciously' refusing to answer questions was satisfied when the
Respondent deliberately refused to comply with an order of the Trial Chamber to
answer questions and persisted in that refusal when fully advised of the position
and given a further opportunity to respond. Since the Chamber had made an order
which it considered to be within its powers and appropriate in the circumstances,
the Respondent was bound to answer the questions put by the Prosecutor, whatever
his views of that order and the propriety of proceeding in the absence of the
Accused."
Joki6, (Trial Chamber), March 27, 2009, para. 12: "Rule 77(A)(i) is imposing
criminal liability where a witness knowingly and willfully interferes with the
Chamber's administration of justice by persistently refusing or failing to answer a
question without reasonable excuse while being a witness before the Chamber."
Jokik, (Appeals Chamber), June 25, 2009, para. 31: "'[C]ontumaciously' falls
within the actus reus of the offence and therefore does not create an additional
element of the mens rea."
Krsti6, (Trial Chamber), July 18, 2013, para. 18: "The Appeals Chamber held
that Rule 77(A)(i) imposes a criminal liability where a witness knowingly and
wilfully interferes with the Chamber's administration of justice by persistently
refusing or failing to answer a question without reasonable excuse while being a
witness before the Chamber. This includes individuals who have been subpoenaed
by a chamber of the Tribunal, who appear before it and then refuse to testify."
(b) actus reus
(i) refusal to answer questions in violation of a
court order
Joki6, (Appeals Chamber), June 25, 2009, para. 30: "[11f 'contumacious' is
defined as 'persistent.' it is in fact more relevant to the actus reus than the mens
rea in the sense of it being a repeated or continuous refusal . . . In light of the
phrase 'malgre la demande qui lui en est faite par la Chambre' (despite the
Chamber's request), the crime under Rule 77(A) of the Rules must be consider
committed not when the witness merely refuses to answer a question put by one of
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the parties, but rather when it is a refusal maintained in the face of the Chamber's
request to answer the question of a party or a question put by the Chamber itself"
(2) 'discloses information relating those proceedings'
(a) mens rea
(i) in knowing violation of a court order
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 19: "[T]the issue
involves both a question of interpretation as to what must be proved to establish
that the violation was a knowing one (a legal question), and a question of fact, as to
whether Mr[. Nobilo's state of mind fell within that interpretation."
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 54: "To satisfy the
mens rea, the prosecution must prove that the Accused had knowledge that the
disclosure was in violation of an order."
Miloevi6, (Trial Chamber), May 13, 2005, para. 17: "Where the issue is one
of compliance with an order of the court, the 'knowledge' required is knowledge of
the making of the order requiring that the Respondent should answer. There is no
question of special knowledge of the consequences of such refusal being required.
It is an obvious consequence of refusing to comply with an order of the Chamber
that the administration ofjustice is interfered with."
Marjai6 and Rebi6, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 18: "The mens
rea element of contempt, when charged under Rule 77(A)(ii), is the knowledge of
the alleged contemnor of the fact that his disclosure of particular information is
done in violation of an order of a Chamber."
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 37: "As a general mens
rea requirement for contempt, the Prosecution must prove that the accused
knowingly and wilfully interfered with the administration of justice. Pursuant to
Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules, it must also prove 'the knowledge of the alleged
contemnor of the fact that his disclosure of particular information is done in
violation of an order of a Chamber."'
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 51: "The Trial Chamber
now turns to the mens rea element of contempt under Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules,
that is, whether the Accused knew that his disclosure of information was done in
violation of an order of a Chamber. The Trial Chamber also considers the mental
element of contempt under Rule 77(A) of the Rules, that is, whether the Accused
knowingly and wilfully interfered with the administration ofjustice."
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Haxhiu, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2008, para. 11: "The mens rea required for
the relevant form of commission of contempt in this case, is the knowledge of the
Accused that his disclosure of particular information is done in violation of an
order of a Trial Chamber."
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), July 7, 2009, para. 179: "[S]ince, as held by the
Appeals Chamber, any violation of a Chamber's order interferes with its
administration of justice, it follows that any knowing and wilful conduct in
violation of a Chamber's order meets the requisite mens rea for contempt, that is, it
is committed with the requisite intent to interfere with the administration of
justice."
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), July 7, 2009, para. 157: "The mens rea for
contempt by disclosure of information contrary to Rule 77 (A)(ii) is knowledge by
the accused that his disclosure of information was done in violation of a court
order. It is sufficient to establish that the act which constitutes the violation is
deliberate and not accidental."
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), January 21, 2009, para. 5: "The mens rea of
contempt, when charged under Rule 77(A)(ii) is the knowledge of the alleged
contemnor of the fact that his disclosure of particular information is done in
violation of an order of a Chamber."
Segej, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2009, para. 9: "The mens rea element for
this form of commission of contempt is the knowledge of the alleged contemnor
that his disclosure of a particular piece of information is done in violation of an
order of a Chamber."
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 22:
"The mens rea required for this particular form of contempt is the disclosure of
particular information in knowing violation of a Chamber's order. Generally, it is
sufficient to establish that the conduct which constituted the violation was
deliberate and not accidental. This may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
Where it is established that an accused had knowledge of the existence of a Court
order, a finding of intent to violate the order will almost necessarily follow."
Segej, (Appeals Chamber), May 19, 2010, para. 26: "[T]he requisite mens rea
for a violation of Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules is knowledge that the disclosure in
question is in violation of an order of a Chamber. Such knowledge may be proven
by evidence other than the accused's statement expressing a particular intent to
disclose protected witness identities." See also Se.§elj, (Trial Chamber), October
31, 2011, para. 32.
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Segelj, (Trial Chamber), June 28, 2012, para. 41: "The mens rea is knowledge
of the facts that make the conduct of the accused illegal, that is, knowledge that the
disclosure was in violation of a Chamber's order."
1. actual knowledge
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 54: "Proof of actual
knowledge of the order, which can be inferred from a variety of circumstances,
satisfies this element ..."
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 44: "It can never be said
that a requirement of actual knowledge may be established by anything less than
actual knowledge. But the acceptance in certain areas of the law of wilful
blindness as establishing knowledge is of some assistance in determining whether,
in any particular case, a 'knowing' violation implies a requirement of actual
knowledge of what has been violated. What must be identified in the present
context is the type of conduct which can properly be described as 'knowing and
willful,' which interferes with the Tribunal's administration of justice and which is
appropriately dealt with as contempt, with its liability for imprisonment or a
substantial fine."
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 37: "'Proof of actual
knowledge of an order would clearly satisfy this element, and actual knowledge
may be inferred from a variety of circumstances.' This can be fulfilled by actual
knowledge, wilful blindness or reckless indifference."
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2009, para. 9: "Proof of actual knowledge of
an order, which can be inferred from a variety of circumstances, satisfies this
element." See also 9eelj, (Trial Chamber), October 31, 2011, para. 32.
Taylor, (Trial Chamber), October 19, 2012, para. 36: "[T]there are three ways
that a violation of Rule 77 (A)(ii) may be satisfied; that is by proof of (i) actual
knowledge that the disclosure is in violation of a Chamber's order; (ii) wilful
blindness to the existence of the order; or (ii) reckless indifference to the existence
of the order."
2. wilful blindness
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 43: "Proof of knowledge
of the existence of the relevant fact is accepted in such cases where it is established
that the defendant suspected that the fact existed (or was aware that its existence
was highly probable) but refrained from finding out whether it did exist because he
wanted to be able to deny knowledge of it (or he just did not want to find out that it
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did exist). In some cases, it has been suggested that such a state of mind is capable
of giving rise to the inference of actual knowledge, but in most cases it is merely
said to be sufficient to prove knowledge."
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 45: "[W]ilful blindness
to the existence of the order in the sense defined is, in the opinion of the Appeals
Chamber, sufficiently culpable conduct to be more appropriately dealt with as
contempt."
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 51: "There can be no
wilful blindness to the existence of an order unless there is first of all shown to be
a suspicion or a realisation that the order exists."
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 54: "In most cases
where it has been established that the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the
existence of the order (either actual knowledge or a wilful blindness of its
existence), a finding that he intended to violate it would almost necessarily
follow."
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 54: "Proof of actual
knowledge of the order, which can be inferred from a variety of circumstances,
satisfies this element, as does proof of wilful blindness For wilful blindness, the
prosecution must first show that the Accused had a suspicion or realization of the
order's existence. In addition, the Accused must have refrained from finding out
whether it did exist, so as to be able to deny knowledge of it."
Marjai6 and Rebi6, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 18: "[A]ctual
knowledge may be inferred from a variety of circumstances. In addition, wilful
blindness to the existence of an order is sufficient. However, to demonstrate wilful
blindness it must first be shown that the alleged contemnor had a suspicion or
realisation of the order's existence."
3. reckless indifference is sufficient
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 54: "There may,
however, be cases where such an alleged contemnor acted with reckless
indifference as to whether his act was in violation of the order. In the opinion of
the Appeals Chamber, such conduct is sufficiently culpable to warrant punishment
as contempt, even though it does not establish a specific intention to violate the
order. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the prosecution that it is sufficient to
establish that the act which constituted the violation was deliberate and not
accidental."
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Haxhiu, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2008, para. 11: "[E]ither willful blindness
or reckless indifference to the existence of the order granting protective measures
to a witness is sufficiently culpable conduct to be dealt with as contempt."
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 22:
"Wilful blindness to the existence of the order, or reckless indifference to the
consequences of the act by which the order is violated may satisfy the mental
element."
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2009, para. 9: "[E]ither wilful blindness or
reckless indifference to the existence of the order granting protective measures to a
witness is sufficiently culpable conduct to be dealt with as contempt." See also
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), October 31, 2011, para. 32.
4. reckless indifference is insufficient
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 54: "Mere negligence
in failing to ascertain whether an order had been made is of an insufficiently
culpable nature to constitute contempt. In my view, under a proper understanding
of the expression 'knowing violation of an order,' the same is true for basic
recklessness."
5. public issuance of an order constitutes notice
Haxhiu, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2008, para. 27: "On both occasions during
these public pronouncements, the Trial Chamber made the nature of the protective
measures granted to the Witness unambiguously clear to those present in the
courtroom and to the public, in that by assigning a pseudonym to him, the Trial
Chamber protected the Witness's identity. Additionally, the Witness's testimony in
Haradinaj was not given in closed session, which is a measure available to Trial
Chambers wishing to also protect a testimony's content. Therefore, the Defence
argument that the Accused was under the impression that it was only the Witness's
testimony that was protected, and not his identity, fails. Furthermore, the Defence
argument that no written decision was served upon the Accused is without merit
because the binding effect of the Trial Chamber's order does not depend on
personal service of that order. It is not to be expected from the Tribunal to serve
upon every journalist, or every member of the public, a written order that certain
information cannot be published. Given its nature, a decision or order publicly
issued by the Tribunal constitutes public notice. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber
notes that the parties have agreed that the Witness's identity was protected at the
time of the publication."
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(ii) mere negligence is never enough
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 45: "Mere negligence in
failing to ascertain whether an order had been made granting protective measures
to a particular witness could never amount to such conduct... Negligent conduct
could be dealt with sufficiently, and more appropriately, by way of disciplinary
action, but it could never justify imprisonment or a substantial fine even though the
unintended consequence of such negligence was an interference with the
Tribunal's administration ofjustice."
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 54: "Mere negligence
in failing to ascertain whether an order had been made is of an insufficiently
culpable nature to constitute contempt."
Haxhiu, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2008, para. 11: "[M]ere negligence in
failing to ascertain whether an order had been made granting protective measures
to a particular witness could never amount to contempt."
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 22:
"Mere negligence in failing to ascertain whether an order had been made is
insufficient."
Segel, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2009, para. 9: "[M]ere negligence in failing
to ascertain whether an order had been made granting protective measures to a
particular witness could never amount to contempt." See also Segelj, (Trial
Chamber), October 31, 2011, para. 33.
(iii) misunderstanding of law is not a defense
Jovie, (Trial Chamber), August 30, 2006, para. 21: "[A] person's
misunderstanding of the law does not excuse a violation of it. Mens rea is
established by an accused's knowledge of an order and his or her conduct in breach
of it... If mistake of law were a valid defence in such cases, orders would become
suggestions and a Chamber's authority to control its proceedings, from which the
power to punish contempt in part derives, would be hobbled. Further, a Tribunal
unable to guarantee the confidentiality of protected witnesses' identities or
testimony would become less able to hear the often pivotal evidence that such
witnesses provide, as those doubtful of the Tribunal's ability to protect information
likely would decline to testify. That would in turn impair the ability of the
Tribunal to perform its function ofjustly adjudicating alleged crimes."
Jovie, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2007, para. 27: "[K]nowledge of the
legality of the Trial Chamber's order is not an element of the mens rea of
contempt; to hold otherwise would mean that an accused could defeat a
prosecution for contempt by raising the defence of a mistake of law. The mens rea
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that attaches to contempt under Rule 77(ii) requires only knowledge of the facts
that make the conduct of the accused illegal; that is, knowledge that the disclosure
was in violation of an order of the Chamber. It is not a valid defence that one did
not know that disclosure of the protected information in violation of an order of a
Chamber was unlawful."
(b) actus reus
(i) disclosure in violation of court order
Se.elj, (Trial Chamber), January 21, 2009, para. 5: "Disclosure of
information, within the meaning of Rule 77(A)(ii), is to be understood as
revelation of information the confidential status of which has not been lifted,
including the publication of a witness' identity where protective measures have
been granted to avoid such disclosure."
Nzabonimana, (Trial Chamber), July 9, 2010, para. 14: "The Chamber recalls
that under Rule 77 (A)(ii) any person who discloses information relating to [the]
proceedings in knowing violation of an order of a Chamber may be held in
contempt."
Jovi, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2007, para. 30: "Any defiance of an
order of a Chamber per se interferes with the administration of justice for the
purposes of a conviction for contempt."
Marijai6 and Rebi, (Appeals Chamber), September 27, 2006, para. 44: "The
language of Rule 77 shows that a violation of a court order as such constitutes an
interference with the International Tribunal's administration of justice."
Milogevi5, (Trial Chamber), May 13, 2005, para. 17: "Proper control of court
proceedings by the Chamber is an essential part of the administration of justice.
Any defiance of an order of the court interferes with the administration ofjustice."
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), July 7, 2009, para. 157: "Under Rule 77 (A)(ii)),
the actus reus for contempt is the physical act of disclosing confidential
information relating to proceedings before this Tribunal in an objective breach of a
court order."
Marjaie and Rebi, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 17: "The actus
reus of this particular form of commission of contempt is the physical act of
disclosure of information relating to proceedings before the Tribunal, when such
disclosure would breach an order of a Chamber. The word disclosure is here to be
understood in its literal sense, being the revelation of something that was
previously confidential."
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Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 20:
"[T]he physical act of disclosure of information relating to proceedings before the
Tribunal, where such disclosure breaches an order of a Chamber. Disclosure is to
be understood as the revelation of information that was previously confidential to a
third party or to the public. This includes information of which the confidential
status has not been lifted."
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2009, para. 10: "The formulation of Rule
77(A) indicates that knowing and wilful interference with the administration of
justice is a consequence of the disclosure of information relating to Tribunal
proceedings in knowing violation of an order of a Chamber. There is therefore no
additional requirement for the Prosecution to prove that such interference actually
occurred."
Chea et al., (Pre-Trial Chamber), September 9, 2010, para. 4(1): "In
accordance with Internal Rule 35(1), the Pre-Trial Chamber may sanction or refer
to the appropriate authorities any person it has found to have knowingly and
wilfully interfered with the administration of justice, including any person who
discloses confidential information not in accordance with the Practice Direction on
the Classification and Management of Case-Related Information, or who is
otherwise in breach of Internal Rule 56(1) insofar as a matter relates to a judicial
investigation." See also Nuon Chea et al., (Pre-Trial Chamber), July 9, 2010, para.
1.
Hartmann, (Appeals Chamber), July 19, 2011, para. 53: "Rule 77(A)(ii) of the
Rules does not purport to restrict liability in terms of any specific kind of
information that might be disclosed. Rather, the focus of Rule 77(A)(ii) of the
Rules is the fact of deliberate disclosure in knowing violation of an order
prohibiting disclosure."
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), June 28, 2012, para. 41: "With respect to Rule
77(A)(ii), the actus reus consists in "the physical act of disclosure of information
relating to proceedings before the Tribunal, when such disclosure would breach an
order of a Chamber."
(i) Continuing disclosure in violation of court
order to remove information from a website
AlJadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 52: "The actus reus of
this form of contempt is the disclosure of information relating to proceedings
before the Tribunal, where such disclosure breaches an order of a Judge or
Chamber. When the order concerns the removal of information that has already
been disclosed, a failure to remove the information constitutes disclosure. In such
case, the prosecution must show that the Accused was in a position to remove or
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cause the removal of the information. In addition, the order must be objectively
breached."
(ii) publication or passing confidential
information to a third party
Marijai6 and Rebi6, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 17: "The word
disclosure is here to be understood in its literal sense, being the revelation of
something that was previously confidential. Thus, the passing of confidential
information to a third party would amount to disclosure, as would the publication
of such information in a newspaper. In addition, the act of disclosing the particular
information must objectively breach an order issued by a Trial or Appeals
Chamber, whether such order is written or oral, before the actus reus of contempt
as articulated in Rule 77(A)(ii) is satisfied."
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2009, para. 9: "Disclosure of information
within the meaning of this Rule includes the publication of a witness's identity
where protective measures have been granted to avoid such disclosure. The
passing of confidential information to a third party would amount to disclosure, as
would its inclusion in a publication such as a newspaper or a book."
(a) manner of possession is no consequence
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 57:
"[T]he manner in which the Accused came into possession of the protected
information that she published in her Book and later in the Article, and therefore
the fact that she did not physically set eyes on the Appeals Chamber Decisions
prior to her suspect interview, is of no consequence to this case. What is of
consequence is that she became aware of the confidential information, and of the
fact of its confidentiality, and disclosed the information nonetheless."
(iii) in objective breach of a court order
Haxhiu, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2008, para. 10: "[T]his form of commission
of contempt is the physical act of disclosure of information relating to proceedings
before the Tribunal in breach of an order of a Trial Chamber . . . this includes
information the confidential status of which has not been lifted. An order by a
Trial Chamber, which may be oral or written, must be objectively breached."
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 21:
"To satisfy the actus reus of contempt as articulated in Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules,
an order by a Trial (or Appeals) Chamber, whether oral or written, must be
objectively breached. Where such a breach has occurred, it is not necessary to
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prove actual interference with the Tribunal's administration ofjustice."
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), October 31, 2011, para. 30: "Disclosure of
information within the meaning of this Rule includes the publication of a witness's
identity where protective measures have been granted to avoid such disclosure.
Disclosure may also include the passing of confidential information to a third
party, as well as its inclusion in a publication such as a newspaper or a book."
(iv) court order must apply to accused, protect
disclosed information, and exist when
information was disclosed
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 36: "The act of disclosing
information must objectively breach an order issued by a Trial or Appeals
Chamber, whether such order is written or oral. The Trial Chamber considers that,
for such an order to be breached, the order must apply to an accused, protect the
specific information disclosed by an accused and be in effect at the time of the
disclosure of information."
1. information was confidential at time of
disclosure
Marjai6 and Rebi6, (Appeals Chamber), September 27, 2006, para. 45:
"[T]he fact that the aforementioned information today is no longer confidential
does not present an obstacle to a conviction for having published the information at
a time when it was still under protection. Although the reason for the Closed
Session Order (to protect the status of the information provided by the Witness) no
longer exists, the legal rationale (protected information has to remain so until
confidentiality is lifted) is still applicable."
(v) no actual interference required
Nshogoza, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2010, para. 56: "No additional
proof of harm to the Tribunal's administration of justice is required. The Appeals
Chamber is not convinced that the defiance of a Chamber's order conveys any
different connotation than a knowing and wilful violation of one." See also Jovi6,
(Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2007, para. 30.
Haxhiu, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2008, para. 10: "It is not necessary to prove
that interference with the Tribunal's administration of justice actually occurred."
Se.elj, (Trial Chamber), October 31, 2011, para. 33: "The formulation of Rule
77(A) indicates that knowing and wilful interference with the administration of
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justice is a consequence of the disclosure of information relating to Tribunal
proceedings in knowing violation of an order of a Chamber. There is therefore no
additional requirement for the Prosecution to prove that such interference actually
occurred."
(vi) confidentiality protects legal reasoning
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 35:
"[L]egal reasoning by its very nature requires the application of the law to the
facts, and therefore requires the whole reasoning to be protected. The law is public
while the facts often are not. The application of the law to the facts is confidential
by virtue of the mix of the two. Exclusion of legal reasoning from the realm of
protection by confidentiality would compromise confidential party submissions
fundamental to the Chamber's legal reasoning."
Hartmann, (Appeals Chamber), July 19, 2011, para. 51: "The legal reasoning
in a confidential decision on protective measures characteristically contains
references to the information or documents directly subject to an order of
protective measures under the Rules, as well as references to related information or
surrounding circumstances that tend to identify the documents or information
directly subject to protective measures. The legal reasoning integrates such
references, together with the law relevant to the determination of the issues, and
the analysis of both by the Chamber in question. It therefore follows that the legal
reasoning of a decision on protective measures necessarily falls within the ambit of
the confidential status ordered in respect of such a decision."
(vii) closed session orders
1. applies to the public/media
Jovie, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2007, para. 22: "[A]n order that
evidence be given in closed session 'applies to all persons coming into possession
of the protected information, given that Rule 79 is directed at the public in general,
including the press, being present in court or not.' Should members of the public
come into possession of the protected information, they are bound, pursuant to
Rule 79, not to disclose it to other third parties."
2. written statements largely the same as
closed session testimony
Marjai6 and Rebi6, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 27: "[W]here
the content of a written witness statement is largely the same as the content of oral
testimony given in closed session, that content must also be considered protected
by the terms of the closed session order, or the protection granted would be
ineffectual."
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3. witnesses who testify entirely in closed
session
Marjajie and Rebie, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 25: "When a
witness testifies entirely in closed session, and his name is only ever mentioned
during that closed session, his name forms part of the closed session transcript,
which is a confidential document ... [W]hen the name of a witness can only be
found in confidential documents of the Tribunal, such as closed session transcripts,
and he appeared in the courtroom only when the blinds were lowered and the audio
and video broadcast suspended, it must be concluded that his identity is protected
by the closed session order."
(iv) not for third parties to decide what should
be protected
Marja~ie and Rebi, (Appeals Chamber), September 27, 2006, para. 42: "The
consequence of a closed session is that all information mentioned therein including
the identity of the witness who testifies is protected from the public. It is not for
third parties to determine which part of a closed session is protected."
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 71:
"Individuals, including journalists, may not - with impunity - publish information
in defiance of such orders on the basis of their own assessment of the public
interest in accessing that information."
Hartmann, (Appeals Chamber), July 19, 2011, para. 52: "The confidential
issuance of a decision by a Chamber constitutes an order for the non-disclosure of
the information contained therein, and it is not for a party to decide which aspects
of a confidential decision may be disclosed. This principle equally applies to third
parties. The discretion as to whether the confidential status of a decision may be
lifted in whole or in part belongs exclusively to a competent Chamber of the
Tribunal with its intimate knowledge of all the facts, information, and
circumstances surrounding the relevant case."
(v) protective measures continue until
rescinded, varied, or augmented
Nshogoza, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2010, para. 65: "Rule 75(F) of the
Rules states that protective measures once ordered continue to have effect in any
proceeding before the Tribunal until rescinded, varied, or augmented." See also
Prosecutor v. Josip Jovie, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2007, para. 30.
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Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 48: "[O]nce protective
measures have been ordered in respect of a victim or witness in any proceedings
before the Tribunal, these protective measures continue to apply mutatis mutandis
unless and until they are 'rescinded, varied or augmented in accordance with the
procedure set out in this rule."'
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 49: "[A]ny rescission of
protective measures would require an explicit act, rather than a failure to
specifically categorise a document as confidential when admitting it into evidence.
As the Mariai6 Appeals Chamber held, protected information must remain
protected "until confidentiality is lifted" because otherwise all protective measures
imposed by a Chamber could be undermined 'without an explicit actus
contrarius. "'
Marjai6 and Rebi6, (Appeals Chamber), September 27, 2006, para. 45: "A
court order remains in force until a Chamber decides otherwise."
(vi) confidentiality to secure cooperation of
sovereign states
Hartmann, (Specially Appointed Chamber), September 14, 2009, para. 72:
"In certain cases, the Tribunal imposes confidentiality to secure the cooperation of
sovereign states. In the present case, the interests sought to be protected by the
two confidential decisions were those of a sovereign state. The witness Robin
Vincent unequivocally confirmed the significant challenges faced by international
tribunals in securing the vital cooperation of sovereign states, observing that 'once
it's recognised that there has been or may well be dangers of breaches [of
confidentiality], then it's unlikely that the cooperation that tribunal seeks will
actually be forthcoming."'
(vii) disclosure by third parties is not a defense
Jovi6, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2007, para. 30: "The fact that some
portions of the Witness's written statement or closed session testimony may have
been disclosed by another third party does not mean that this information was no
longer protected, that the court order had been de facto lifted or that its violation
would not interfere with the Tribunal's administration ofjustice."
Seiej, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2009, para. 28: "[T]he fact that protected
witnesses testifying at the Tribunal may occasionally be identified by persons in
the public despite the use of a pseudonym as well as other protective measures
cannot justify the disclosure of confidential information in a book published by an
accused before the Tribunal."
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(viii) may restrict freedom of expression and
press
Jovi6, (Trial Chamber), August 30, 2006, para. 23: "It is undeniable that legal
instruments relevant to the work of this Tribunal protect freedom of expression.
But it is equally undeniable that, as the Presiding Judge noted at trial, 'all the
instruments to which [the Accused] refer[red] on freedom of the press have
qualifications in relation to court proceedings.' As the instruments provide, a
court's restriction of press freedom is permissible if authorised by law and
necessary for the maintenance of an interest such as 'the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.'
Marjai and Rebi6, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 39: "Chambers
have the power under the Statute to exclude the press and public from Tribunal
proceedings, should it be considered appropriate to do so, and to prohibit the press
from publishing protected material. Individuals, including journalists, cannot then
decide to publish information in defiance of such an order, on the basis of their
own assessment of the public interest in that information."
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 81: "[A] journalist has no
right to violate a Chamber's orders. It is undeniable that legal instruments relevant
to the work of the Tribunal protect freedom of expression and freedom of the
press. As the Jovik Trial Chamber has clearly outlined, these rights have, however,
qualifications in relation to court proceedings. While freedom of expression and
freedom of the press are fundamental rights, such rights can be limited in relation
to court proceedings."
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Al Amin, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para.
14: "As the allegations of contempt in this case relate to publications by the press
and other media, it is necessary to consider both the principles pertaining to
freedom of expression, which include freedom of the press, and the proper
administration of justice. Where there is a potential conflict, courts evaluating
these principles must identify and state them with clarity and apply the law in a
manner that respects the values underpinning each. To a certain degree this
exercise is likely to be case-specific." See also New TV S.A.L. and Al Khayat,
(Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para. 14.
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Al Amin, (Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para.
17: "With respect to contempt of the Tribunal, this means that the freedom of the
press must find its limits where it impinges upon the Tribunal's ability to function
properly as a criminal court and to administer justice for the benefit of the people
of Lebanon. In this regard, the Tribunal's contempt power expressed in Rule 60 his
is an acceptable limit on the freedom of the media to report on all matters
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concerning the Tribunal because it punishes only conduct that undermines the
administration of justice. It leaves intact the ability of the press otherwise to
comment on the Tribunal's work, including criticizing it. But it does not allow for
interference with the Tribunal's mandate." See also New TV S.A.L. and Al Khayat,
(Contempt Judge), January 31, 2014, para. 17.
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 41: "There is no doubt
that this count engages the freedom of the press. However, its implication in this
case is properly addressed only if and after the Amicus has proved the elements of
the count. Should these elements (actus reus and mens rea) be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, then I am required to consider whether the Accused's conduct
was justified, accounting for both the freedom of the press and the need to ensure
the integrity of the Tribunal's proceedings. The journalistic profession may not be
used as an impenetrable shield; where different legitimate interests are involved,
they must be weighed in light of the priorities in a democratic society. In sum, the
freedom of the press does not relate to the legal foundation of the charge but, if
anything, to the possible justification of the conduct."
3. as authorized by law and necessary to protect
others
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 81: "Human rights law
allows for a court to restrict freedom of expression and freedom of the press when
such a restriction is authorised by law and necessary for 'the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."'
Hartmann, (Appeals Chamber), July 19, 2011, para. 161: "[I]n order to
legitimately restrict Hartmann's freedom of expression under Article 19 of the
ICCPR, the restriction must have been provided by law and proportionately
necessary to protect against the dissemination of confidential information."
(3) 'discloses information relating those proceedings' not in
violation of a court order but nonetheless undermining
public confidence in the courts' authority
(a) generally
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 40: "As affirmed
above, Rule 60 bis (A) encompasses an array of conduct. In response to the
Defence's assertion, I observe that there need not be legal precedent matching the
exact behaviour charged in a given case. Here, the only requirement is that the
conduct charged can amount to knowing and wilful interference with the
administration ofjustice. I consider, in principle, that the disclosure of information
on purported confidential witnesses can undermine public confidence in the
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Tribunal's ability to protect the confidentiality of information about, or provided
by, witnesses or potential witnesses, and that such undermining can interfere with
the administration of justice. Indeed, while the disclosure of information on
purported confidential witnesses does not necessarily interfere with the
administration of justice, it could do so, if certain effects and a culpable state of
mind are proved. Undoubtedly, maintaining public confidence in courts' authority
and their ability to administer justice is essential to protecting their proper
functioning; such that even the right to criticize is not limitless."
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 45: "On the other
hand, unlike violating a court order-the very act of which amounts to an
interference with the administration of justice-disclosing information on
purported confidential witnesses does not automatically constitute contempt.
Indeed, I cannot find that public confidence has been undermined just on the basis
of 'common sense,' uncorroborated by evidentiary proof. Not every disclosure of
this kind of information would create such likelihood."
(b) mens rea
AlJadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 50: "I find that, in this
context, what is required for the prosecution is to establish that the Accused (1)
deliberately broadcast and/or published information on purported confidential
witnesses, and (2) in doing so they knew that their conduct was objectively likely
to undermine public confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect the
confidentiality of information about, or provided by, witnesses or potential
witnesses."
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 50: "Actual
knowledge that the conduct created such likelihood, which can be inferred from a
variety of circumstances, suffices, as does wilful blindness. For wilful blindness,
the prosecution must first show that the Accused had a suspicion or realization of
the likelihood. In addition, the Accused must have refrained from finding out
about the likelihood, so as to be able to deny knowledge of it."
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 50: "In my view,
however, basic recklessness representing a lower degree of culpability, cannot
amount to the "knowing and wilful" conduct required for contempt."
(c) actus reus
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 43-44: "In order to
satisfy the actus reus for this count, the prosecution must first prove that the
Accused actually broadcast and/or published information on purported confidential
witnesses in the Ayyash et al. case. Exactly what or how much information is
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sufficient will depend on the circumstances. However, I consider that the
disclosed information must at least be significant enough that the relevant
individual is reasonably identifiable in the circumstances. In addition, the
prosecution must show that such broadcast and/or publication created a likelihood
of undermining public confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect the
confidentiality of information about, or provided by, witnesses or potential
witnesses."
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 44: "Contrary to the
Defence's submission, the prosecution need not demonstrate that public confidence
was in fact undermined."
Al Jadeed, (Trial Chamber), September 18, 2015, para. 46: "Accordingly, in
this case the conduct must, when it occurred, have been of sufficient gravity to
create, objectively, the likelihood of undermining the public confidence in the
Tribunal's ability to protect the confidentiality of information about, or provided
by, witnesses or potential witnesses. Such likelihood cannot be proved in
subjective terms (for example, on the basis of the personal feelings of a small
number of people). Under the required objective test, likelihood can only be
proved through ascertainable facts. Whether or not the Accused's conduct in fact
caused harm can be relevant to, but is not dispositive of, the existence or degree of
objective likelihood at the relevant time."
(4) 'fails to comply with an order to appear'
(a) mens rea
(i) knowing and wilful conduct
Pe6anac, (Trial Chamber), December 9, 2011, para. 19: "[A]ny knowing and
wilful conduct in violation of a Chamber's order meets the requisite mens rea for
contempt."
(b) actus reus
(i) objective breach of an order
Pe6anac, (Trial Chamber), December 9, 2011, para. 18: "To satisfy the actus
reus of contempt under Rule 77(A), an order by a Chamber, whether oral or
written, must be objectively breached." See also Tupaji6, (Trial Chamber), 24
February 2012.
(ii) Without good cause
Pekanac, (Trial Chamber), December 9, 2011, para. 28: "[W]hether during
the period from the service of the Subpoena on the Accused... to his arrest ... the
Accused failed to appear before the Chamber as ordered or to show good cause
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why he could not comply with the Subpoena."
(5) 'threatens, intimidates, causes any injury, offers a bribe
to, or otherwise interferes with a witness'
(a) mens rea
(i) knowingly and wilfully
Seel], (Trial Chamber), June 28, 2012, para. 40: "The mens rea is established
where an accused wilfully and knowingly interfered with the Tribunal's
administration of justice. The Appeals Chamber has held that 'once a knowing
violation of a Chamber's order is proved, '[n]o additional proof of harm to the [ ... ]
Tribunal's administration of justice is required' in order to sustain a conviction for
contempt."'
Simik et al, (Trial Chamber), June 30, 2000, para. 91: 'The inherent power is
to hold in contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with the Tribunal's
administration of justice. It includes intimidation of, interference with, or an offer
of a bribe to, a potential witness before the Tribunal, or any attempt to intimidate
or to interfere with such a witness."
(ii) intent to interfere
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), July 7, 2009, para. 158: "Besides the general
mens rea requirement for contempt, for which the Prosecution must also prove that
the Accused acted knowingly and wilfully, Rule 77 (A) (iv) also requires that the
conduct was carried out with the intent to interfere with the witness or with the
knowledge that the conduct was likely to deter or influence the witness."
Margetie, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 66: "As a general mens
rea requirement for contempt, the Prosecution must prove that the Accused acted
knowingly and wilfully. Rule 77(A)(iv) of the Rules also requires that the conduct
was carried out with an intent to interfere with witnesses."
Haraqija and Morina, (Trial Chamber), December 17, 2008, para. 19: "The
mens rea requires proof that the accused acted willingly and with the knowledge
that his conduct was likely to deter or influence the witness."
(iii) motive has limited probative value
Haraqija and Morina, (Trial Chamber), December 17, 2008, para. 59: "[J]ust
as the existence of a motive to commit a crime is in itself of minimal, if any,
probative value that the accused has committed it, the absence of a motive cannot
disprove facts established through reliable evidence. The absence of a motive
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may, however, call for further exploration of the convincing potential of the
evidence before establishing that the crime was committed and that the accused
committed it. In the present case, however, the evidence is strong and
convincing."
(b) actus reus
Haraqija and Morina, (Trial Chamber), December 17, 2008, para. 18: "The
conduct punishable pursuant to Rule 77(A)(iv) of the Rules includes threatening,
intimidating, causing injury, offering a bribe to or otherwise interfering with a
witness."
(i) threats
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 16: "A 'threat' is liberally
construed as a 'communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another person or
another property, especially one that might diminish a person's freedom to act
voluntarily or with lawful consent.' A threat can also be defined as the expression
of an intention to inflict unlawful injury or damage of some kind so as to
intimidate or overcome the will of the person to whom it is addressed."
Haraqya and Morina, (Trial Chamber), December 17, 2008, para. 18: "A
'threat' is defined as a communicated intent to inflict harm or damage of some
kind to a witness and/or the witness's property, or to a third person and/or his
property, so as to influence or overcome the will of the witness to whom the threat
is addressed."
(ii) intimidation
(a) knowing and willful conduct
likely to intimidate a witness
Haraqija and Morina, (Trial Chamber), December 17, 2008, para. 18:
"'Intimidation' consists of acts or culpable omissions likely to constitute direct,
indirect or potential threats to a witness, which may interfere with or influence the
witness's testimony."
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 17: "In relation to 'intimidation,'
the Committee of Experts on Intimidation of Witnesses and the Rights of the
Defense of the Council of Europe defined intimidation as '[a]ny direct, indirect or
potential threat to a witness, which may lead to interference with his/her duty to
give testimony free from influence of any kind whatsoever."'
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Brdjanin, (Trial Chamber), March 19, 2004, para. 23: "The actus reus of the
offence of intimidating a witness as contempt of court consists of acts or culpable
omissions that are likely to constitute direct, indirect, or potential threats to a
witness or a potential witness. In order for the conduct in question to amount to
contempt of court, said conduct must be of sufficient gravity to be likely to
intimidate a witness. These acts or omissions must be evaluated in the context of
the circumstances of each particular case."
(b) no proof of actual interference
required
Brdjanin, (Trial Chamber), March 19, 2004, para. 23: "Intimidation of a
witness as contempt of court is crime of conduct, which does not require proof of a
result. Whether the witness was actually intimidated is immaterial; the Prosecution
need only prove that the conduct in question was intended to interfere with the
Tribunal's due administration ofjustice."
(iii) bribe
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 18: "The word 'bribe' is
liberally construed as an inducement offered to procure illegal or dishonest action
or decision in favour of the giver. It is also defined as a price, reward, gift or
favour bestowed or promised with a view to pervert the judgement of or influence
the action of a person in a position of trust."
(iv) otherwise interfering with a witness
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 21: "[O]therwise interfering
with witnesses encompasses any conduct that is intended to disturb the
administration of justice by deterring a witness or a potential witness from giving
full and truthful evidence, or in any way to influence the nature of the witness' or
potential witness' evidence."
Margetk, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 64: "The phrase
'otherwise interfering with a witness or potential witness' adds to these specifically
provided acts any conduct that is likely to dissuade a witness or a potential witness
from giving evidence, or to influence the nature of the witness' or potential
witness' evidence. The Trial Chamber considers that any conduct which is likely
to expose witnesses to threats, intimidation or injury by a third party also
constitutes 'otherwise interfering with a witness' as provided by Rule 77(A)(iv)."
Haraqija and Morina, (Trial Chamber), December 17, 2008, para. 18:
"'Otherwise interfering with a witness' is an open-ended provision which
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encompasses acts or omissions, other than threatening, intimidating, causing injury
or offering a bribe, capable of and likely to deter a witness from giving full and
truthful testimony or in any other way influence the nature of the witness's
evidence."
Brdjanin, (Trial Chamber), March 19, 2004, para. 28: "The actus reus for the
offence of otherwise interfering with a witness may take one of a number of
different forms. Such forms include, but are not limited to, keeping a witness out
of the way, by bribery or otherwise, so as to avoid or prevent service of a
subpoena; assaulting, threatening or intimidating a witness or a person likely to be
called as a witness; endeavouring to influence a witness against a party by, for
instance, disparagement of the party; or endeavouring by bribery to induce a
witness to suppress evidence."
(v) conduct may be direct or through
intermediaries
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 65: "The Trial Chamber
considers that such conduct can be fulfilled through personal or direct contact, as
well as through intermediaries or through the media by way of publications."
(vi) no proof of actual interference
required
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 64: "Proof is not required
that this conduct actually produced such a result."
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 21: "There is nothing to indicate
that proof is required that the conduct intended to influence the nature of the
witness's evidence produced a result."
Haraqija and Morina, (Trial Chamber), December 17, 2008, paras. 18, 20:
"[F]or the purposes of establishing the responsibility of the accused, it is
immaterial whether the witness actually felt threatened or intimidated, or was
deterred or influenced .... any act described in Rule 77(A) of the Rule shall be
subject to the same penalties as one who commits the act."
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), July 24, 2009, para. 27: "[F]or the purposes of
establishing the responsibility of an accused for having threatened, intimidated, or
otherwise interfered with a witness under Rule 77(A)(iv) of the Rules, it is
immaterial whether the witness was actually threatened, intimidated, deterred or
influenced."
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(vii) undue influence
Nyiramasuhuko et al, November 30. 2001. para. 20: "Rule 77(C) of the
Rules, which refers to interference with a witness as contempt, is to be construed
as prohibiting only undue interference with a witness. Undue interference with the
Prosecution witnesses who were allegedly contacted could have occurred, in the
present case, if the individuals concerned acted in knowing and wilful violation of
a witness protection order of this court, or if they tried to intimidate witnesses, as
specified under Rule 77(C) of the Rules, or, notably, if they tried to induce them to
change their testimony."
B) Incitement to commit contempt
Haraqija and Morina, (Trial Chamber), December 17, 2008, para. 20:
"Incitement to commit Contempt of the Tribunal is punishable, as such, by virtue
of Rule 77(B) of the Rules. Whereas commission requires that the person's acts
form part of the actus reus element of the offence, without however being limited
to direct and physical perpetration, incitement relates to actions that encourage or
persuade another to commit the offence. It follows that any person who knowingly
and wilfully encourages and/or persuades another person to commit any act
described in Rule 77(A) of the Rules shall be subject to the same penalties as one
who commits the act."
C) Sufficient grounds for instigating contempt proceedings
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), July 7, 2009, para. 176: "The Tribunal may hold
persons in contempt who knowingly and wilfully interfere with the administration
ofjustice, but the fact that a Trial Chamber has reason to believe that a person is in
contempt does not oblige it to order an investigation or prosecution. The Chamber
does not consider it necessary to explore the variety of factors that may influence a
Chamber's decision whether or not to order an investigation or prosecution for
contempt once its discretion to do so is enlivened. It is sufficient to note that
decisions taken pursuant to Rule 77 are discretionary."
Ngirabatware, (Trial Chamber), March 12, 2010. para. 4: "[T]he 'sufficient
grounds' standard under Rule 77(D) of the ICTY Rules only requires the Trial
chamber to establish whether the evidence before it gives rise to a primafacie case
of contempt of the Tribunal and not to make a final finding on whether contempt
has been committed. The Chamber further notes that Rule 77 of the ICTY Rules is
identical to Rule 77 of the ICTR Rules and considers that, therefore, the same legal
standard applies."
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), November 25, 2010, para. 20: "[E]ven where
there are sufficient grounds and therefore a prima facie case to pursue contempt
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proceedings, a Trial Chamber may consider the gravity of an alleged perpetrator's
conduct or his underlying motivations when deciding whether to initiate contempt
proceedings."
Nsengimana, (Appeals Chamber), December 16, 2010. para. 17: "[D]ecisions
taken pursuant to Rule 77(D) of the Rules are discretionary. Accordingly, the Trial
Chamber was entitled to find a prima facie case of contempt and then determine,
within the bounds of its discretion, whether or not to initiate proceedings against
the Investigators."
Brima et al., (Trial Chamber), March 18, 2011, para. 26: "Notwithstanding
the lower standard of proof, an allegation of contempt must be credible enough to
provide a judge or Trial Chamber with 'reason to believe' that a person may be in
contempt."
Nshogoza, (Appeals Chamber), July 7, 2011, para. 12: "[A] Trial Chamber is
entitled to find a prima facie case of contempt and then determine, within the
bounds of its discretion, whether or not to initiate further proceedings."
Ngirabatware, (Trial Chamber), February 21, 2013, para. 8: "[E]ven where
the prima facie standard has been met, the Chamber retains discretion to determine
whether to initiate proceedings for contempt. The Chamber is entitled to find a
prima facie case of contempt and then determine, within the bounds of its
discretion, whether to initiate proceedings."
i) 'Reason to believe' standard to investigate
Nzabonimana, (Appeals Chamber), October 28, 2010, para. 10: "The Appeals
Chamber recalls that, according to Rule 77(C)(ii) of the Rules, when a Trial
Chamber has reason to believe that a person may be in contempt of the Tribunal, it
may direct the Registrar to appoint an amicus curiae to investigate the matter and
report back to the Chamber as to whether there are sufficient grounds for
instigating contempt proceedings."
Nzabonimana, (Trial Chamber), October 21, 2011. para. 13: "If a Chamber
has reason to believe that a person may be in contempt of the Tribunal, it may, in
its discretion, direct an investigation of the matter under Rule 77(C). The Chamber
again notes the permissive language (i.e. the use of the word 'may') of both
provisions of Rule 77."
Chea, (Trial Chamber), March 13, 2012, para. 9: "The threshold for
intervention under this rule is a reasonable belief that a person 'knowingly and
wilfully' interfered in the administration of justice. The relevant jurisprudence has
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emphasised that requests sought under this sub-rule must be based upon good
cause, and that investigative requests cannot instead be utilized in order to
ascertain whether or not such cause might exist."
Chea, (Trial Chamber), May 11, 2012, para. 20: "According to Internal Rule
35(2), a Chamber seized with allegations of interference with the administration of
justice may only act under this rule where it has a reason to believe that a person
may have interfered with the administration of justice, for example by improperly
influencing the judges in charge of a case. This is a minimum, threshold condition
for inquiry, triggered by a 'reasonable belief that conduct with the potential to
threaten the administration of justice may have occurred. It gives rise merely to
further inquiry and does not require the Chamber to engage in a detailed
examination of the merits of an allegation or suspicion of interference, or to assess
questions of individual criminal responsibility. This threshold will be satisfied
where the material basis for the allegation reasonably leads a Chamber to believe
that the allegation is not merely speculative. Where there is a reasonable belief
that a person may have interfered with the administration of justice, the Chambers
or Co-Investigating Judges may - but need not - take one or more of the courses of
action set out in Rule 35(2), which includes dealing with a matter summarily."
Chea, (Supreme Court Chamber), September 14, 2012, para. 26: "Pursuant to
Rule 35, the body seised of a request must examine the allegations; assess whether
there is, at a minimum, reason to believe that any of the acts encompassed by Rule
35(1) may have been committed; and decide the appropriate action, if any, to be
taken pursuant to Rule 35(2)."
Ayyash et aL, (Contempt Judge), April 29, 2013, para. 13: "When the
Contempt Judge has reason to believe that a person may be in contempt of the
Tribunal, he may: (i) invite or direct the Prosecutor to investigate the matter and
prepare an indictment for Contempt; (ii) where the Prosecutor is unable to
investigate the matter, he may direct the Registrar to appoint an amicus curiae to
report on whether there are sufficient grounds for commencing contempt
proceedings; (iii) or prosecute the matter himself."
(1) no open-ended investigations
Nzabonimana, (Trial Chamber), December 8, 2010, para. 45: "Pursuant to
Rule 77, a Trial Chamber may direct the Registrar to appoint amicus curiae to
investigate allegations of contempt when it has reason to believe that a person may
be in contempt of the Tribunal. This rule does not permit the Chamber to direct
the registrar to appoint amicus curiae to conduct an open-ended investigation on
the basis of ill-defined threats made by unnamed individuals or poorly defined
organisations."
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ii) 'Sufficient grounds' standard satisfied by a prima facie
case for contempt
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), November 25, 2010, para. 7-8: "Pursuant to Rule
77 (C), when a Chamber has reason to believe that a person may be in contempt of
the Tribunal, it (i) may direct the Prosecutor to investigate the matter with a view
to the preparation and submission of an indictment for contempt; or (ii) where the
Prosecutor has a conflict of interest with respect to the relevant conduct, may direct
the Registrar to appoint an amicus curiae to investigate the matter and report back
to the Chamber as to whether there are sufficient grounds for instigating contempt
proceedings; or (iii) initiate proceedings itself ... The sufficient grounds standard
is satisfied where the evidence establishes a prima facie case of contempt."
Nzabonimana, (Trial Chamber), October 21, 2011, para. 14: "The ICTR
Appeals Chamber has held that the 'sufficient grounds' requirement within Rules
77 [...] is satisfied if the Chamber finds that a primafacie case exists. The prima
facie standard is the standard employed by Trial Chambers in determining whether
to confirm an indictment pursuant to Article 18 of the Statute. The prima facie
standard for confirming an indictment was articulated by the ICTY Trial Chamber
in Milogevic, as 'a credible case which, if accepted and uncontradicted, would be a
sufficient basis on which to convict the accused."'
Nzabonimana, (Trial Chamber), October 21, 2011. para. 15: "The primafacie
standard is a relatively low burden which requires the Chamber to take the
evidence adduced in support of the allegations as true. If there is evidence in
support of each of the elements of the alleged crime, the prima facie standard has
been satisfied and there are sufficient grounds to initiate proceedings. The
credibility and reliability of witness testimony is only to be examined at the
conclusion of the case."
Ngirabatware, (Trial Chamber), February 21, 2013. para. 6: "The Chamber
notes that the Appeals Chamber held that 'the "sufficient grounds" standard under
Rule 77(D) of the ICTY Rules only requires the Trial chamber to establish whether
the evidence before it gives rise to a prima facie case of Contempt of the Tribunal
and not to make a final finding on whether contempt has been committed.' The
Chamber further notes that Rule 77 of the ICTY Rules is identical to Rule 77 of the
ICTR Rules and considers that, therefore, the same legal standard applies."
Ngirabatware, (Trial Chamber), February 21, 2013. para. 7: "The Chamber
notes that the prima facie standard is a relatively low burden which requires the
Chamber to take the evidence adduced in support of the allegations as true. If
there is evidence in support of each of the elements of the alleged crime, the prima
facie standard has been satisfied and there are sufficient grounds to initiate
proceedings. The credibility and reliability of witness testimony is only to be
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examined at the conclusion of a case."
iii) Discretion to initiate contempt proceedings
Nyiramasuhuko et al., (Trial Chamber), July 10, 2001, para. 6: "For this
reason, and bearing in mind the principle of the presumption of innocence, any
allegations of contempt are to be handled with due care. Consequently, the
Prosecution is to justify its request for investigations by prima facie satisfying the
Trial Chamber that there are reasonable grounds to believe that contemptuous
conduct may have taken place, which may be attributable to the alleged
contemnor."
Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, May 18, 2010, para. 7: "If a
Chamber has reason to believe that a person may be in contempt of the Tribunal, it
may, in its discretion, direct an investigation of the matter under Rule 77(C). The
Chamber again notes the permissive language (i.e. the use of the word 'may') of
both provisions of Rule 77."
Nsengimana, (Appeals Chamber), December 16, 2010, para. 8: "The Appeals
Chamber recalls that the decision whether to order the prosecution of alleged false
testimony or contempt is discretionary."
Nsengimana, (Appeals Chamber), December 16, 2010, para. 22: "[P]ursuant
to Rule 77(D), the Trial Chamber my decline to initiate contempt proceedings
despite the fact that sufficient grounds exist to proceed against a person for
contempt."
Chea, (Supreme Court Chamber), March 25, 2013, para. 21: "It follows from
a plain reading of Rules 35(1) and 35(2) of the Internal Rules that Judges and
Chambers enjoy the discretion to decide what procedural avenue to follow against
acts of prima facie interference with the administration of justice, and that they are
also entitled to decide, within the bounds of their discretion, whether to take any
procedural action at all, even where they may believe interference to have
occurred."
Nzabonimana, (Trial Chamber), October 21, 2011, para. 16: "Nonetheless,
even where the prima facie standard has been met, the Chamber retains discretion
whether to initiate proceedings for contempt or false testimony."
Ngirabatware, (Trial Chamber), February 21, 2013, para. 8: "Nonetheless,
even where the prima facie standard has been met, the Chamber retains discretion
to determine whether to initiate proceedings for contempt. The Chamber is
entitled to find a prima facie case of contempt and then determine, within the
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bounds of its discretion, whether to initiate proceedings."
Chea, (Trial Chamber), May 11, 2012, para. 20: "According to Internal Rule
35(2), a Chamber seized with allegations of interference with the administration of
justice may only act under this rule where it has a reason to believe that a person
may have interfered with the administration of justice, for example by improperly
influencing the judges in charge of a case. This is a minimum, threshold condition
for inquiry, triggered by a 'reasonable belief that conduct with the potential to
threaten the administration of justice may have occurred. It gives rise merely to
further inquiry and does not require the Chamber to engage in a detailed
examination of the merits of an allegation or suspicion of interference, or to assess
questions of individual criminal responsibility. This threshold will be satisfied
where the material basis for the allegation reasonably leads a Chamber to believe
that the allegation is not merely speculative. Where there is a reasonable belief
that a person may have interfered with the administration of justice, the Chambers
or Co-Investigating Judges may - but need not - take one or more of the courses of
action set out in Rule 35(2), which includes dealing with a matter summarily."
(1) ensuring compliance with court orders
Nsengimana, (Appeals Chamber), December 16, 2010, para. 23: "[A]lthough
the Trial Chamber was not required to determine whether the initiation of contempt
proceedings against the Investigators [sic] was 'the most effective and efficient
way to ensure compliance with the witness protection measures,' the Appeals
Chamber finds that the consideration of these factors was within the scope of its
discretion."
Nzabonimana, (Trial Chamber), October 21, 2011, para. 18: "In exercising its
discretion whether to initiate proceedings for false testimony or contempt, the
Chamber may take into consideration certain factors, such as (i) indicia as to the
mens rea of the witness, including his intent to mislead and cause harm; (ii) the
relationship between the statement in question and a material matter in the case;
and (iii) the possible bearing of the statement in question on the Chamber's final
decision. In short, the Chamber must consider carefully if proceedings for false
testimony or contempt are the most effective and efficient way to ensure
compliance with obligations flowing from the Statute or the Rules in the specific
circumstances of the case."
Nzabonimana, (Trial Chamber), November 18, 2011, para. 12: "According to
the established jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber, the 'sufficient grounds'
requirement of Rule 77 (D) is satisfied if the Chamber finds that a primafacie case
exists. Moreover, even if a prima facie case has been established, a Chamber
retains discretion whether to initiate proceedings for contempt, and ought to
carefully consider whether proceedings for contempt are the most effective and
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efficient way to ensure compliance with obligations flowing from the Statute or the
Rules in the specific circumstances of the case."
(2) chamber may initiate contempt proceedings itself
Segelj, (Trial Chamber), July 8, 2008, para. 11: "Article 77 (C) of the Rules
describes the procedure to be undertaken when 'la Chambre a des motifs de croire
qu 'une personne s'est rendue coupable d'outrage au Tribunal.' In this case, the
Chamber may, pursuant to Rule 77 (C) of the Rules, 'where the Prosecutor, in the
view of the Chamber, has a conflict of interest with respect to the relevant conduct,
direct the Registrar to appoint an amicus curiae to investigate the matter and report
back to the Chamber as to whether there are sufficient grounds for instigating
contempt proceedings. "
Nshogoza, (Trial Chamber), November 25, 2010, para. 8: "Where a Chamber
considers that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against a person for
contempt, in accordance with Rule 77 (D), the Chamber may: (i) in circumstances
described in sub-Rule (C)(i), direct the Prosecutor to prosecute the matter; or (ii) in
circumstances described in sub-Rules (C)(ii) or (iii), issue an order in lieu of an
indictment and either direct amicus curiae to prosecute the matter or prosecute the
matter itself."
Zeevik, (Trial Chamber), February 4, 2011, para. 4: "When a Chamber has
reason to believe that a person may be in contempt of the Tribunal, it may initiate
proceedings itself and if the Chamber considers that there are sufficient grounds to
proceed against a person for contempt, it may issue an order in lieu of an
indictment and either direct amicus curiae to prosecute the matter or prosecute the
matter itself."
Hartmann, (Appeals Chamber), July 19, 2011, para 25: "[T]he Chamber in
which the contempt allegedly occurred shall adjudicate the matter unless there are
exceptional circumstances such as cases in which the impartiality of a Chamber
may be called into question, warranting the assignment of the case to another
Chamber."
Chea, September 9, 2011, para. 21: "Internal Rule 35(2) contemplates an
investigation into such allegations '[w]hen the Co-Investigating Judges or the
Chambers have reason to believe that a person may have knowingly and wilfully
interfered with the administration of justice.' It follows that an investigation
pursuant to this Rule can only be meaningfully be conducted by the judicial body
seised of the case."
Ngirabatware, (Trial Chamber), February 21, 2013, para. 5: "Rule 77(D)(ii)
provides that after having appointed an amicus curiae to present a report to the
Chamber, and '[i]f the Chamber considers that there are sufficient grounds to
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proceed against a person for contempt, the Chamber may ... issue an order in lieu
of an indictment."'
Krstie, (Trial Chamber), March 27, 2013, para. 8: "When a Chamber has
reason to believe that a person may be in contempt of the Tribunal, it may initiate
proceedings itself and if the Chamber considers that there are sufficient grounds to
proceed against a person for contempt, it may issue an order in lieu of an
indictment and either direct amicus curiae to prosecute the matter or prosecute the
matter itself"
(a) indictment must contain precise charges
Aleksovski, (Appeals Chamber), May 30, 2001, para. 56: "It is therefore
essential that, where a Chamber initiates proceedings for contempt itself, it
formulates at an early stage the nature of the charge with the precision expected of
an indictment, and that it gives the parties the opportunity to debate what is
required to be proved. It is only in this way that the alleged contemnor can be
afforded a fair trial."
iv) Independence of contempt proceedings
Karemera et al., (Appeals Chamber), February 16, 2010, para. 25:
"[I]nvestigations and proceedings pursuant to Rule 77 of the Rules are independent
of the proceedings, out of which they arise and can be undertaken
contemporaneously with those proceedings. As separate proceedings, they give
rise neither to concerns regarding inconsistent findings, nor to concerns regarding
the expeditiousness of the trial."
D) Punishment for contempt of court
i) Penalty
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 65: "Rule 77(G) stipulates that
'the maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in contempt of
the Tribunal shall be a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years, or a fine
not exceeding 100,000 Euros, or both."'
(1) discretion
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 66: "The Rule gives discretion
to the Chamber to choose between three forms of punishment, a term of
imprisonment, a fine or a combination thereof."
Joki6, (Trial Chamber), March 27, 2009, para. 38: "In deciding punishment
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for contempt, Chambers have considered the gravity of the conduct, the need to
deter such conduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors in the individual's
circumstance. These factors are non-exhaustive and the Chamber is vested with
broad discretion as to the weight accorded to these factors based on the facts of a
particular case."
(2) administrative sanctions
Chea (Supreme Court Chamber), September 14, 2012, para. 44: "[I]t is
reasonable to interpret Rule 35 as applicable to a wider set of corrective responses
that are administrative in nature. These responses include, for example, an
admonition; notice to self-regulatory bodies, the superior or contracting authority
of the culprit; publication of the outcome of proceedings in the media; or a limited
administrative fine. These administrative sanctions still must comport with the
basic principles of necessity and proportionality."
ii) Purposes
Pekanac, (Trial Chamber), December 9, 2011, para. 39: "The purpose of the
law of contempt is to prevent frustration of the administration of justice. In
deciding the punishment to be imposed for contempt, Chambers have taken into
consideration both the gravity of the conduct involved and the need to deter such
conduct in the future . . . While Trial Chambers are obliged to take these factors
into account when determining the punishment, they are not limited to considering
them alone. Furthermore, they are vested with a broad discretion as to the weight
to be accorded to these factors, based on the facts of the particular case."
Tupaji6, (Trial Chamber), February 24, 2012, para. 31: "The Chamber
considers the dual nature of the purpose of punishing contempt. First, the
punishment is retributive in that it punishes conduct that is found to obstruct,
prejudice, or abuse the administration of justice. Second, the punishment has a
deterrent effect which ensures to protect the interests of justice by preventing such
action from occurring again in the future. Therefore, in deciding the punishment to
be imposed for contempt, Chambers have taken into consideration both the gravity
of the conduct involved and the need to deter such conduct in the future."
(1) retribution
Beqaj, (Trial Chamber), May 27, 2005, para. 58: "The Trial Chamber has
considered the purposes of punishment which generally apply before the Tribunal.
The contempt requires punishment as retribution for actions of the Accused. This
punishment has then a deterrent effect which serves to protect the interests of
justice."
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(2) gravity and deterrence
Marijaid and Rebi, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 46: "The most
important factors to be taken account of in determining the appropriate penalty in
this case are the gravity of the contempt and the need to deter repetition and similar
conduct by others."
Marjai6 and Rebi, (Trial Chamber), March 10, 2006, para. 50: "Any
deliberate conduct which creates a real risk that confidence in the Tribunal's ability
to grant effective protective measures would be undermined amounts to a serious
interference with the administration of justice. Public confidence in the
effectiveness of such orders is absolutely vital to the success of the work of the
Tribunal."
Margeti6, (Trial Chamber), February 7, 2007, para. 84: "The Trial Chamber
considers that the two most important factors to be taken account of in determining
the appropriate penalty in contempt cases are the gravity of the conduct and the
need to deter repetition and similar action by others."
(3) ensuring fair trial
Chea, (Supreme Court Chamber), September 14, 2012, para. 45: "Rule 35 is
primarily designed for the application of punitive measures with the objective of
deterrence. The Supreme Court Chamber considers, however, that Rule 35 also
serves the overarching goal of ensuring an effective and fair trial. In this respect,
the duty of the court is not just to punish the interference with the administration of
justice, but also to stop on-going interference and prevent its potential occurrence.
These duties are particularly valid in the face of interference that endangers a
fundamental right, such as the right to a fair trial. It is therefore reasonable to
construe, a majori ad minus, that the ECCC may resort to the procedures under
Rule 35 to apply not only the sensu stricto punitive measures (sanctions) but also
undertake other corrective responses that are non-punitive in nature and do not
require the finding of culpability (intent), in order to safeguard the right to a fair
trial. The Supreme Court believes that this holding also articulates the position
implicitly adopted in the Impugned Decision."
E) Appeal of Contempt of Court
i) Standard of review
Marija&k and Rebie, (Appeals Chamber), September 27, 2006, para. 15:
"Article 25 of the Statute provides for appeals on the ground of an error of law that
invalidates the decision or an error of fact that has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice. The settled standard of review applicable for appeals against judgements
also applies to appeals against convictions for contempt. A party alleging an error
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of law must identify the alleged error, present arguments in support of its claim
and explain how the error allegedly invalidates the decision."
Jovi6, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2007, para. 11: "On appeal, the parties
must limit their arguments to legal errors that invalidate the decision of the Trial
Chamber and factual errors that have occasioned a miscarriage ofjustice within the
scope of Article 25 of the Statute. The settled standard of review for appeals
against judgements also applies to appeals against convictions for contempt." See
also Contempt Proceedings Against Vojislav Segelj, (Appeals Chamber), May 30,
2013, para. 25.
Haraqija and Morina, (Appeals Chamber), July 23, 2009, para. 14: "The
Appeals Chamber reviews errors of law which invalidate the decision of the Trial
Chamber and errors of fact which have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. This
standard of review applicable for appeals against judgements also applies to
appeals against convictions for contempt."
Nshogoza, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2010, para. 12: "[T]he applicable
standards of appellate review pursuant to Article 24 of the Statute of the Tribunal
("Statute"). The Appeals Chamber reviews errors of law which invalidate the
decision of the Trial Chamber and errors of fact which have occasioned a
miscarriage of justice. This standard of review, applicable for appeals against
judgements, also applies to appeals against convictions for contempt." See also
Prosecutor v. Prince Taylor, Case No. SCSL-12-02-A (Appeals Chamber),
October 30, 2013, para. 25-27.
Segelj, (Appeals Chamber), May 19, 2010, para. 9: "On appeal, the Parties
must limit their arguments to legal errors that invalidate the judgement of the Trial
Chamber and to factual errors that result in a miscarriage of justice within the
scope of Article 25 of the Statute of the Tribunal ("Statute"). The settled standard
of review for appeals against judgements also applies to appeals against
convictions for contempt."
ii) Decisions to investigate and prosecute contempt
reviewed for discernible errors
Nshogoza, (Appeals Chamber), July 7, 2011, para. 11: "A Trial Chamber's
decision to initiate an investigation or prosecution of contempt pursuant to Rule 77
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal ("Rules") is a matter that
falls within its discretion. In order to successfully challenge a discretionary
decision, a party must demonstrate that the Trial Chamber committed a discernible
error."
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iii) Decisions under Rule 77 subject to appeal
(1) plain meaning of the rule
Sebureze and Turinabo, (Appeals Chamber), March 11, 2013, para. 7: "Rule
77(J) should be accorded its plain meaning - that '[a]ny decision rendered by a
Trial Chamber under this Rule shall be subject to appeal."'
(2) decisions disposing of contempt cases and other
circumstances
Sebureze and Turinabo, (Appeals Chamber), March 11, 2013, para. 4: "ICTR
Rule 77(J) provides that 'Any decision rendered by a Trial Chamber under this
Rule shall be subject to appeal.' Two previous Appeals Chamber decisions have
asserted that an appeal under Rule 77(J) lies 'only with respect to decisions
disposing of a contempt case.' However, the Appeals Chamber decisions cited in
support of that proposition expressly held that there are other circumstances in
which appeals are also permitted."
(3) decisions involving right to a fair trial
Sebureze and Turinabo, (Appeals Chamber), March 11, 2013, para. 4: "The
Appeals Chamber has expressly stated in would 'also' entertain appeals under Rule
77(J) where the decision in question would 'harm the party's right to a fair trial."'
(4) challenges to jurisdiction, referral of case,
provisional release
Sebureze and Turinabo, (Appeals Chamber), March 11, 2013, para. 5: "The
Appeals Chamber has never had occasion to exhaustively define what other
decisions or issues are appealable under Rule 77(J). At a minimum, that Rule
should be interpreted as encompassing the same decisions from which an appeal
lies as of right in 'regular' proceedings. That would include: challenges to
jurisdiction, referral of a case, provisional release."
(5) judgements, decisions not to investigate, denials of
requests to investigate
Nzabonimana, (Appeals Chamber), May 11, 2011, para. 13: "Rule 77(J) of
the Rules as applying to appeals against judgements on contempt, decisions
denying a request for investigation into allegations of contempt, and decisions
dismissing a request to initiate contempt proceedings."
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(6) sentencing reviewed for discernible errors
JovkW, (Appeals Chamber), March 15, 2007, para. 38: "The Appeals Chamber
recalls that Trial Chambers are vested with broad discretion in determining an
appropriate sentence. In general, the Appeals Chamber will not revise a sentence
unless an appellant demonstrates that the Trial Chamber committed a discernible
error in exercising its discretion or failed to follow the applicable law."
Marijai and Rebi6, (Appeals Chamber), September 27, 2006, para. 53:
"Trial Chambers are vested with broad discretion in determining an appropriate
sentence. In general, the Appeals Chamber will not revise a sentence unless the
Appellant demonstrates that the Trial Chamber has committed a 'discernible error'
in exercising its discretion or has failed to follow the applicable law. It is for the
Appellant to demonstrate how the Trial Chamber ventured outside its discretionary
framework in imposing the sentence."

